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ARTICLE

WHO CARES?: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
LEGAL DUTY TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY
CARE
Karen H. Rothenberg*
INTRODUCTION

The refusal to treat those in need of emergency care remains a
fact of life in this country. 1 The following two reports are recent
examples of a problem that will not go away:
Terry Takewell was a young diabetic. Gasping for breath, he
was taken by ambulance to the only local hospital in Fayette
County, Tennessee. Takewell was not treated, but instead was
carried out the door by a hospital administrator and set on the
edge of the parking lot. He was picked up by neighbors and
brought home. He died the next day. Terry had no insurance and
owed the hospital a lot of money. 2
* Assistant Professor of Law & Director, Law & Health Care Program, University of
Maryland. B.A., 1973, Princeton University; M.P.A., 1974, Woodrow Wilson School of Public International Affairs, Princeton University; J.D., 1979, University of Virginia. My sincere
thanks to Kathy L. Tubbs, my research assistant, for her dedication and hard work.
1. This Article will primarily focus on the evolution of the legal duty to provide access
into the emergency room and not on the inappropriate transfer of patients, commonly referred to as "dumping," from private to public hospitals. This distinction should be clear
throughout the discussion of the common law. Refer to Sections I, II & ill infra. The evolution of legislative efforts, however, does not make such a clear distinction. Some recent state
and federal legislation is comprehensive in scope and addresses both the duty to examine
those who present themselves at emergency rooms, as well as the inappropriate transfer of
these patients. Refer to Sections IV A & V infra.
2. See Equal Access to Health Care: Patient Dumping: Hearing Before the Subcom·
mittee on Human Resources & Intergovernmental Relations of the House Committee on
Government Operations, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 14-20 (1987) [hereinafter Equal Access)
(statement of Zettie Mae Hill).

21
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"Jane Doe" was six and a half months pregnant. She went to
the local hospital in Fredicksburg, Virginia, bleeding heavily and
in severe pain. The hospital nurse told her nothing could be done
for her because she did not have a private doctor on staff. She
was instructed, after a few hours elapsed, to go to University Hospital - a two hour drive away. When she finally reached University Hospital, the doctor could not prevent the delivery of a premature baby. The baby died soon after birth.3

These cases should never have happened. The hospitals were
breaking the law. In 1986, Congress passed comprehensive legislation, commonly referred to as "COBRA,"" requiring hospitals receiving Medicare to examine all persons who present themselves
for care in the emergency room. 11 Those patients in an emergency
condition or in active labor must be provided treatment until they
are stabilized. Tough enforcement provisions include termination
or suspension of the Medicare provider's agreement and civil penalties. Perhaps most significantly, the statute provides for a private
right of action in which any individual harmed by a hospital's violation of the statute may obtain damages and equitable relief. 0
One can only appreciate the potential of such legislative action
by understanding the legal responses, reactions, and frustrations of
the past. Toward that goal, this Article will analyze the evolution
of the legal duty to provide emergency care.
The first section examines the major legal factors that contributed to the delay in creating a duty to treat. Nineteenth century
tort theory established a distin"ction between misfeasance and nonfeasance. Thus, even in an emergency, there was no legal duty for
any person, including a physician, to rescue or care for a person. 7
3. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 43 (statement of Judith Waxman, Managing Attorney, National Health Law Program).
4. The Medicare amendments were incorporated as a part of a major spending bill, the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985. Refer to note 291 infra
and accompanying text.
5. Virtually all hospitals receive Medicare reimbursement. This legislation went into
effect on August 1, 1986 and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. IV 1986).
6. Refer to Section V infra.
7. Refer to Section lA infra. Physicians have no legal duty to treat anyone who desires
medical treatment. Courts will not find a duty to treat on the part of a physician unless
there has been an implied or expressed consensual agreement creating a physician-patient
relationship. See, e.g., Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no
writ). There may be, however, an ethical duty. The American Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics provides: "[a] physician shall, in the provision of appropriate patient
care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve ..." AMERICAN MED. Ass'N,
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS VI (1980), reprinted in BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES
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Theoretically, the same rule applied to the hospital.8 Any attempt
to challenge this legal theory as applied to the hospital was delayed
for at least half a century by the shield of charitable immunity. To
a large extent, charitable immunity, retarded the creation of a duty
by protecting the hospitals from suit. A challenge to the no-duty
rule posed a concurrent, undesired challenge to charitable immunity. Furthermore, what little case law existed on the issue of a
duty to treat was often misinterpreted.
Section TI analyzes the search for a legal duty, which began in
the early 1960s and failed to find a common-law stronghold. This
BIOMEDICAL ETmcs 331-32 (1983) [hereinafter AMA].
8. Limitations inherent in the traditional hospital structure may have created a further barrier to imposing clearly delineated duties to provide emergency care. At least three
different hospital-physician relationship models exist in the emergency room. First, the
emergency room physicians may be hospital employees. These physicians may work in the
emergency room as part of a series of rotations through different departments or may work
exclusively there, but in either case they are reimbursed through a salary which is paid by
the hospital. Second, the physicians may be private physicians with hospital privileges who
rotate through the emergency room as "on-call" physicians. Reimbursement in this situation
generally comes directly from the patient. Finally, the physicians may be part of a group
that has contracted with the hospital to perform emergency services. Reimbursement is generally from the hospital under the terms of the contract, but the physicians are considered
independent contractors and not employees. This group does not norm!!lly have admitting
privileges.
Since Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), courts have
found little difficulty in holding hospitals liable for the negligence of employee-physicians
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Generally, if the hospital exerts significant control over the physician, the hospital may be held vicariously liable for any negligence.
The second and third types of relationships have posed greater problems. Because physicians in these situations are not considered employees, the doctrine of respondeat superior
does not apply. In utilizing one of these arrangements, the hospital may avoid liability for
the negligence of emergency room physicians.
The courts, however, soon recognized the unfairness of allowing hospitals to "contract.
away" their liability, and found ways to circumvent these situations using the doctrines of
ostensible or apparent agency and corporate negligence. For a more det.niled discussion, see
Comment, Medical Malpractice by Emergency Physicians and Potential Hospital Liability, 75 KY. L.J. 633, 638-41 (1987). See also Mehlman v. Powell, 281 Md. 269, 378 A.2d 1121,
1124 (1977) (apparent agency; absent notice to the contrary, a hospital represents that the
staff of its emergency room are its employees); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hosp., 33 lll. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 260·61 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (corporate negligence; hospital may be held liable for the negligence of a private physician in
failing to review and monitor treatment and in failing to enforce its own medical staff
bylaws).
Another problem in this area involves the role of the "on-call" specialist who serves the
emergency room. Necessity often dictates that in an emergency the emergency room physician call in a neurosurgeon, orthopedic surgeon, plastic surgeon, or in the case of active
labor, an obstetrician. H these physicians refuse to treat, how can one hold the hospital
liable? Unless these specialists are employees, which is most unusual, difficulty arises under
current doctrines in holding the hospital liable under common law. Refer to Section V infra.
OF
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section includes an in-depth review of Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove 9 and its progeny-or lack thereof. Many commentators predicted over twenty-five years ago that after Manlove, the
legal solution to the problem was found. 10 Manlove established
that when a hospital customarily renders emergency care service,
and such undertaking is relied on by a person in need of emergency care, the hospital has a duty to provide service to such person. Contrary to popular belief, this reliance theory failed to provide the solution. The applications of, limitations of, and
accommodations to the Manlove reliance theory will be examined.
Section III analyzes the common-law search for an alternative
to the Manlove theory. In 1975, in Guerrero v. Copper Queen Hospital, 11 the Arizona Supreme Court created a duty based on a public policy theory, requiring hospitals to provide emergency care. 12
The theory was quite innovative, but not widely adopted outside
the state.
Given that the common law, at best, has met with only limited
success in assuring that emergency care is provided, Section IV
briefly examines state legislation and past federal initiatives. With
few exceptions, state laws and federal Hill-Burton Act13 obligations
have had a limited impact on creating a statutory duty to provide
emergency services.
COBRA has perhaps the greatest potential for enforcing a legal duty to provide nationwide emergency care. Yet certain ambiguities remain that may undercut its impact. Section V analyzes
COBRA in detail and suggests ways to strengthen its effect. Particular attention is focused on the civil enforcement provision which
provides, in part, for a private right of action for any individual
harmed by a hospital's violation. This provision symbolizes the
present endpoint to the evolution of the legal duty to provide
emergency care. The evolution, however, will continue as the
courts begin to interpret the new federal law. How the courts define the scope of the law and enforce the remedies available may
ultimately determine whether the legal solution to the problem of
access to emergency care has been found. 14
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
Refer to Section II infra.
112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975)(en bane).
537 P.2d at 1331.
42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982). Refer to Section IVB infra.
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is obvious that any legal solution is

HeinOnline -- 26 Hous. L. Rev. 24 1989

EMERGENCY CARE

1989]

25

I. WHY No DUTY?

A. The No-Duty Rule
During the nineteenth century, neither the hospital nor the
physician had a duty to help those in need of emergency care, even
if the help was readily available. Although injury, mental anguish,
pain and death might result, the traditional common law provided
no remedy; at least, that was the perception.
Tort theory embraced the distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance.15 Essentially, the no-duty rule provides that no
tort liability is imposed for nonfeasance, or failing to aid one in
peril. Liability attaches only when one is guilty of misfeasance, or
active misconduct that injures another. There exist several narrow
classes of exceptions to this rule, but none is traditionally applied
to hospitals.16
The misfeasance-nonfeasance dichotomy theoretically results
in no legal obligation to treat an injured, sick, or dying person appearing at an emergency room door.l'l If treatment is initiated,
however, the hospital and its staff have a duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances and will be liable for harm caused
by a breach of that duty. 18 This breach is misfeasance.
As a result, tort law was perceived to provide no legal incentive to treat. To the contrary, the hospital was better off, from a
liability standpoint, if it refused to treat at all. Of course, this perception was merely theoretical because, for a number of reasons,
hospitals generally did not get sued.
compounded by the economic burden of providing this care to many without insurance-and without a mechanism for reimbursing hospitals for these expenses.
15. W. KEEToN, D. DoBBS, R. KEEToN & D. OWEN, PRoSSER AND KEEToN ON ToRTS § 56
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEEToN].
16. The list of exceptions includes public carriers, innkeepers, and employers. Jd.
17. Although not legally binding, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals,
a voluntary accreditation agency, has issued policy statements which provide that "[a)ny
individual who comes to the hospital for emergency medical evaluation or initial treatment
shall be properly assessed by qualified individuals, and appropriate services shall be rendered within the defined capability of the hospital" JOINT CoMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION 01'
HosPITALS, AccREDITATION MANuAL FOR HosPITALS 17 (1985). The agency further requires
that "[i]ndividuals shall be accorded impartial access to treatment or accommodations that
are available or medically indicated, regardless of race, creed, sex, national origin, or sources
of payment for care." Id. at ix.
18. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 323 (1965).
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B. Charitable Immunity
Historically, most hospitals were run as charitable or public
institutions/ 9 and consequently were protected by charitable or
sovereign immunity. Courts could not hold a hospital liable, without dismantling established immunity protections. The duty to
treat was rarely mentioned until the 1960s, when a number of factors, including the increasing abrogation of charitable immunity,
cleared the way for suits against hospitals. Therefore, the imposition of any duty to treat in an emergency was at least delayed by
the shield of immunity.20
In 1876, one of the first cases to mention, in dictum, that there
was no right to demand medical care, also recognized the charitable immunity doctrine in the United States for the first time. 21 In
19. For an outstanding discussion of the evolution of hospitals and their changing role
over the last two centuries in the United States see C. RosENBERG, TilE CARE OF STRANGERS:
THE RISE OF AMERICA'S HOSPITAL SYSTEM (1987).
20. The significance of sovereign or governmental immunity, as applied to public hospitals, continues to be modified to a large degree by state tort claims acts. The rule of governmental or sovereign immunity and its effect have been largely state-specific; however, tho
general rule is that a government cannot be sued without its consent. The rule stems from
the legal fiction, which grew up in Europe, that "the King can do no wrong," based, in part,
on the idea that a claim cannot be enforced against the authority that created the claim.
The impact of governmental immunity has been uneven, depending not only on the presence or absence of statutory authorization allowing suits against the government, but also on
court distictions between governmental and proprietary activities.
In the context of a hospital, courts impose liability for proprietary activities, but,governmental functions remain protected by immunity, barring a statute to the contrary. Tho
courts, however, have not been consistent in their distinctions between governmental and
proprietary functions. For example, some courts have decided that if a hospital is operated
by a governmental agency or unit, and takes at least some nonpaying patients, its activities
are governmental. Others have held that charging patients is evidence of a proprietary func·
tion and have disallowed immunity, at least as to a paying patient. See generally Annotation, Immunity from Liability for Damages in Tort of State or Governmental Unit or
Agency in Operating Hospital, 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952); 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GnAY,
THE LAw OF ToRTS §§ 29.1-29.15A (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter GRAY].
Furthermore, it is the public hospital that accepts the heavy, ever-increasing burden of
treating emergencies for those without insurance. Not-for-profit hospitals, which traditionally served almost two-thirds of the poor population, face changes in hospital funding that
do not allow for cross-subsidizing the care of the uninsured. With recent competitive pressures to reduce costs, many of these supposedly charitable institutions are shifting their
indigent emergency patients to the already overcrowded and underfunded public hospitals.
See Equal Access, supra note 2, at 105 (statement of Arnold Reiman, M.D., Editor, NEW
ENGLAND JouRNAL OF MEDICINE). The focus of this Article will be on the nonprofit, private
hospital and the significance of charitable immunity as borne out in the history of the cases.
21. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 120 Mass. 432 (1876). The court therein
noted, in discussing the character of a charitable hospital, that the trustees were responsible
for determining those "who are to be the immediate objects of the charity, and that no
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McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 22 the plaintiff
brought an action against the hospital, alleging that his leg had
been negligently set by an intern.23 The court, relying on an 1861
English case, denied recovery based on a charitable immunity doctrine.24 The court reasoned, under the "trust fund theory," that
the hospital, as a public charity, could not use donated funds to
pay tort damages. 25 What apparently was unknown to the A1cDonald court, however, was that the English decision on which it relied
had been overruled some ten years earlier.26
Nevertheless, charitable immunity took a strong hold in
America. By 1938, more than forty state courts had adopted the
doctrine. 27 Charitable immunity is an exception to the general rule
that one is liable for one's own negligence, and several theories
have been used to justify the doctrine. 2 s The four major theories
are: (1) the "trust fund" theory; (2) the inapplicability of responperson has individually a right to demand admission to its benefits ••••" Id. at 435.
22. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
23. Id.
24. I d. at 436 (citing Holliday v. St. Leonard's, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861)).
25. The court stated:
[The hospital] has offered to [plaintiff] freely those ministrations which, as
the dispenser of a public charity, it has been able to provide for his comfort • • • •
It has no funds which can be charged with any judgment which he might recover,
except those which are held subject to the trust of maintaining the hospital [l)f
there has been no neglect on the part of those who administer the trust and control its management, and if due care has been used by them in the selection of
their inferior agents, even if injury has occurred by the negligence of such agents,
it cannot be made responsible.
I d.
26. See Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500, 1501 (1866) (overruling
Holliday in principle before it was later overruled by name in Foreman v. l\fuyor of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214, 218 (1871)). The court in President of Georgetown College v. Hughes,
130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942) noted:
In this state of the English decisions, Massachusetts adopted the repudiated
rule of Holliday v. St. Leonard in McDonald v. Massachusetts Generol Hospitul,
•.. and Maryland followed [the overruled case of Feoffees of Heriot's Hospitul v.
Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846)] in Perry v. House of Refuge, 1885, 63 Md. 20, 52
Am. Rep. 495. Apparently both courts acted in ignorance of the English reversaL
In any event, they resurrected in America a rule already dead in England, and
thereby gave Lord Cottenham's dictum [in Heriot's Hospital] a new lease on life
in the New World.
130 F.2d at 816.
27. Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and Their Continuing Immunity,
100 HARv. L. REv. 1382, 1384 (1987) [hereinafter Charitable Torts].
28. For an excellent detailed analysis of charitable immunity, see GRAY, supra note 20,
§§ 29.16 - 29.17. See also note 30 infra (discussing the four major theories justifying the
charitable immunity doctrine).
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deat superior theory; (3) the implied waiver theory; and (4) the
"public policy" theory. 29 All four theories have been subject to substantial criticism. 30
With time and various challenges to the theories of charitable
immunity, the doctrine fell into disfavor. As early as 1915, and
peaking in the 1950s and 1960s, states abrogated the doctrine
through either judicial decision or legislative action. 31
29. GRAY, supra note 20, at § 29.6.
30. The McDonald case is an example of the trust fund theory, explained by Lord
Cottenham in Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846): "To give dam·
ages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the
fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely different purpose." I d. at 1510.
The trust fund theory has been rejected in part due to the argument that donors do not
intend to and cannot lawfully exempt the benefactors of their donations from their rights
under the law. GRAY, supra note 20, § 29.16, at 755. Essentially, the trust fund theory is
illogical. It assumes what it is trying to prove, that payment of tort damages is not a charitable purpose. ld.
The second theory rests on the argument that since a charity does not financially bene·
fit from the labor of its employees, the principle of respondeat superior is inapplicable to a
charitable institution. The theory has been soundly criticized as inconsistent with the basis
for respondeat superior, the employer's right to control his or her employee through diroc·
tion and selection. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic Church, 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W.2d 249,
253 (1963). For further discussion, see GRAY, supra note 20, § 29.16, at 759.
The third theory is the implied waiver theory. This is based on the legal fiction that one
who accepts the benefits of a charity impliedly waives any right to recover for injury due to
negligence. The theory is widely criticized and represents perhaps the most unsupportable
reason for the application of charitable immunity. See generally Note, The Diminishing
Doctrine of Charitable Immunity: An Analysis, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 187, 193 (1969). To require the patient in need of charitable assistance to give up any right to damages if he or
she is injured seems unjust. While some courts hold that the implied waiver does not apply
to paying patients, this does not relieve the heavy burden on the poor individual who must
seek treatment at a charitable hospital. GRAY, supra note 20, § 29.16, at 760-62.
A broad public policy theory has also been used to justify charitable immunity. The
rationale is based on the notion that since charities are "good," the law should protect and
foster their existence. It is believed that immunity encourages donations while liability
would make persons less willing to donate to charities, although the evidence is to the con·
trary. Id.
Logically, the public policy theory must fail. First, if the threat of tort liability acts to
deter bad medical practice, then immunity tends to foster negligence, and promoting chari·
table negligence is hardly consistent with the public good. Second, if donors are benevolent
persons who wish to help others, leaving victims of negligence with no remedy defeats donors' intentions. ld.
Immunity as a means of sustaining a charity's existence has also been challenged, espe·
cially given the availability of insurance to guard against large tort judgments. Although
insurance availability has become problematic, hospitals have pooled resources and devol·
oped self-insurance funds to address current needs. ld.
31. For the view that charitable immunity has not been abolished to the extent goner·
ally believed, see Charitable Torts, supra note 27, at 197. See also 2 D. LOUISELL & H.
WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 17.22 (1988) for a complete listing of the statUS of chari·
table immunity in each state.
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Not surprisingly, as use of the doctrine diminished, cases
against hospitals, including those asserting a right to treatment,
began to appear in the courts. For example, the first case to deal
with a hospital's duty relating to emergency care was a 1934 Alabama case, Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews. 32 Alabama was
one of the first states to abolish the charitable immunity doctrine-as applied to employees and paying beneficiaries in 1915,33
and then as to invitees in 1933.3 ' The next case to deal directly
with this issue was a 1960 New York case, O'Neill v. Montefiore
Hospital. 35 The O'Neill court decided this case only three years
after New York abrogated its charitable immunity doctrine.313 The
great majority of cases dealing with the duty of a hospital to treat
appeared in the 1960s as the charitable immunity doctrine fell into
increasing disfavor. 37

C. The Misinterpretation of the Case Law
Even without immunity, the few courts that addressed the
duty to treat misinterpreted the case law, further confusing the issue and retarding new development in the area. When describing
the character of a charitable trust, the McDonald court stated, in
1876, that "no person has individually a right to demand admis32. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934). Refer to notes 43-53 infra and accompanying text.
33. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 9 (1915).
34. Alabama Baptist Hosp. Bd. v. Carter, 226 Ala. 109, 145 So. 443, 445 (1932), afrd,
227 Ala. 560, 151 So. 62 (1933). Liability as to nonpaying beneficiaries is still an open question in Alabama.
35. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960). Refer to notes 54-60 infra
and accompanying text.
36. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 667, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9, 163 N.Y.S. 2d 3, 12 (1957).
37. See, e.g., Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135, 140 (1961)
(private hospital's duty to treat in an unmistakable emergency); Durney v. St. Francis
Hosp., Inc., 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753, 758 (1951) (Delaware abolished charitable immunity);
Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 1953) (abolishing the immunity doctrine in Florida); Ruvio v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 186 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966), cert. denied, 195 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1966) (no liability in the absence of the hospital's
negligence); LeJuene Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965) (private hospital has no duty to admit any patient); New Biloxi Hasp., Inc. v. Frazier,
245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882, 887 (1962) (hospital providing emergency treatment must
provide suitable medical attention); :Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss.. 906, 55
So. 2d 142, 156 (1951), aff'd, 214 Miss. 906, 56 So. 2d 709 (1952) (Mississippi abolished the
immunity doctrine); Stanturf v. Sipes, 447 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Mo. 1969) (duty to treat when
reducing medical services); Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's, 446 S.W.2d 599, 60S (Mo.
1969) (en bane) (:Missouri abolished charitable immunity). Refer to Section ll infra.
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sion to [a charity's] benefits."38 This statement had no relationship
to the controversy, nor was it supported by any case law. It had its
impact nonetheless. In 1924, in VanCampen v. Olean General
Hospital, 39 a New York court noted that "[t]he law does not require a [hospital] to furnish its services and accommodations to
everyone who applies, whether patient or physician."40 Similarly,
in Levin v. Sinai Hospital," 1 the Maryland Court of Appeals stated
that "[a] private hospital is not under a common-law duty to serve
every one who applies for treatment or permission to serve."42 McDonald, Van Campen, and Levin dealt only with a hospital's right
to grant or revoke staff privileges, not the right to emergency care.
Yet, to this day, courts continue to cite these cases for the no duty
to treat rule.
Birmingham Baptist Hospital v. Crews 43 , decided fifty-eight
years after McDonald, did involve treatment in an emergency
room. The plaintiff brought his daughter to the hospital for treatment of diphtheria."" The staff administered antitoxin and oxygen,
but refused to admit her as a regular patient, fearing contagion.4 G
She died soon after leaving the hospital. 46
The child's father brought a wrongful death action, charging
that the hospital had "received her for hospital service and then
wrongfully refused to render that service, and required her to be
carried away, at a time when she needed it, resulting in an acceleration of her death."47 The court rejected the plaintiff's argument,
carefully distinguishing between "treatment in an emergency," and
"full hospital service."48 The court found that the hospital administered proper emergency treatment, and acted appropriately in
following its established policy of refusing admission to persons
with contagious diseases. 49
38. 120 Mass. at 435. Refer to note 21 supra.
39. 210 A.D. 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 (1924) (physician challenge to arbitrary cancellation
of hospital privileges).
40. Id. at 209, 205 N.Y.S. at 558 (dictum).
41. 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946) (physician challenge of denial of hospital
privileges).
42. Id. at 180, 46 A.2d at 301.
43. 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934).
44. Id. at 399, 157 So. at 225.
45. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225.
46. Id., 157 So. at 225.
47. Id. at 399, 157 So. at 225.
48. Id. , 157 So. at 225-26.
49. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225-26.
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Apparently, the court recognized a two-stage process: (1)
emergency treatment; and (2) in-patient care. The distinction supported the holding that there was no abandonment of the patient
upon completion of the care at the first stage when care at the
second stage had not begun. The reasons for the distinctions are
not clearly stated, although the opinion alludes to a fear that hospitals would be put in a no-win situation if held liable for abandonment even after taking every possible step to help a victim.110
Despite the Crews court's distinction between emergency and
in-patient care, the case is often cited erroneously as support for
the proposition that a hospital may refuse to treat persons, even in
an emergency situation. 111 The Crews court did state that a private
hospital was under "no duty to accept any patient not desired by
it,"52 but whether that statement applied to emergency or in-patient care or both is uncertain. Clearly, the Crews holding does not
reach the question of the duty to provide emergency medical care.
The court explicitly states that proper emergency care was given.113
By the time of the Crews decision, there was no case holding
that denied the existence of a duty of emergency care. The AfcDonald court's statement was dictum, discussing only the character of a charitable trust. The VanCampen and Levin cases both
involved physician staff privileges and did not discuss a duty to
give medical treatment. Finally, although the Crews case dealt
with treatment, the duty to provide emergency medical treatment
50. Id., 157 So. at 225-26. The court explained:
Our judgment is that the only fair inference from these facts is that the treatment given was but an emergency treatment as the only hope in a desperate situation, administered as soon as the trouble was diagnosed, and that, since it is admitted to have been the appropriate thing to do in such emergency, it d~ not
justify an inference that defendant undertook to do more than was immediately
apparent as the only hope. We think that such treatment d~ not justify an inference that defendant undertook to render ordinary hospital service in violation or
its rules, and so as to endanger the lire or health of other patients. • • • The willingness of defendant to provide such treatment should not be used to its
prejudice.•..
Id., 157 So. at 225-26.
51. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 141 Ariz. 597, 602 n.3,
688 P.2d 605, 610 n.3 {1984); Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 DeL 15, 21, 174 A.2d
135, 138 (1961); LeJuene Road Hosp. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 203 {Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Fjerstad v. Knutson, 271 N.W.2d 8, 11 {S.D. 1978); Mercy Medical Center or Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis. 2d 260, 266, 206 N.W.2d 198, 200 {1973).
52. 229 Ala. at 399, 157 So. at 225.
53. Id. at 400, 157 So. at 225. The court refers to the action of the hospital as "an
emergency treatment" and "the appropriate thing to do in such an emergency." /d., 157 So.
at 225.
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was not at issue.
The 1960s, however, saw various courts begin to struggle with
the "assumed" general rule that there was no duty on the part of a
hospital to treat, even in an emergency. O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital64 was the first case to approach the issue directly. The court
framed the issue as whether "there was a duty owing respectively
by the hospital and the doctor to examine and treat plaintiff's deceased husband."1515 The nurse in the emergency ward had made a
phone call for the decedent, to his doctor. 156 The court queried
"whether the conduct of the nurse in relation to the deceased was
in the nature of a personal favor to him or whether her conduct
was that of an attache of the hospital trying to discharge her
duty." 157 In other words, the court wanted a determination as to
whether by her actions she "undertook to provide medical attention for the deceased."158
By focusing on this aspect of the case, the court sidestepped
the issue of a hospital's duty to treat and focused on a more traditional abandonment issue. Apparently, the opinion assumes that
absent a hospital-patient relationship, analogous to the physicianpatient relationship, 159 there is no duty to treat. If the nurse in
some way began medical treatment by making the phone call, then
the hospital could be held liable. If the call was only a "favor," the
court intimates that there would be no basis for liability. 00
Although the O'Neill court asked, but did not directly answer,
the question of whether a hospital must treat in an emergency, its
questionable justification for liability-that through its agent, the
hospital began some form of medical treatment by phoning a doctor-suggests an attempt at a solution and a dissatisfaction with
the perceived state of the common law. 61 This frustration set the
54. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960).
55. Id. at 133, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
56. Id. at 134, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 438.
57. Id. at 135, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
58. Id., 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
59. Refer to note 8 supra.
60. O'Neill, 11 A.D.2d at 135, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
61. Courts have found that a hospital, by initiating some treatment, created a sufficient hospital-patient relationship (i.e., an "implied admission") and, therefore, had a duty
to provide care. See Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 50 Tenn. App. 460, 362 S.W.2d 475 (1961);
Bourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957); Citizens Hosp. Ass'n. v. Schoulin, 262
So. 2d 303 (Ala. Ct. App. 1972). Ball, Bourgeois, and Schoulin apparently were motivated
by the same concerns expressed in O'Neill. See also Fine, Opening the Closed Doors: The
Duty of Hospitals to Treat Emergency Patients, 24 WASH. U.J. URD. & CoNTEMP. L. 123,
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stage for the first case that imposed a duty to treat in an
emergency.
II.

THE

MANLoVE

CASE: THE SEARCH FoR

A DuTY

The facts of Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove 02 were
compelling. Parents brought their infant son, suffering from diarrhea and a high fever, to the local hospital.63 The nurse on duty
refused to treat the child because hospital policy dictated that in
the absence of a "frank indication of emergency," 64 patients already attended by a private doctor must be admitted by that doctor before receiving treatment. 611 The child died of bronchial pneumonia a few hours later.66 The parents brought a wrongful death
action against the hospital, presenting the Delaware court with a
new legal challenge to the no-duty rule. 67
A. The Superior Court Decision: The Quasi-Public Theory

The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment08 in the Superior Court, relying on the no-duty rule and characterizing the
nurse's action as nonfeasance.69 The hospital argued that there was
no duty to treat, diagnose, or admit the Manlove baby.70 To avoid
the established rule, the plaintiff contended that the nurse's inaction constituted an incorrect diagnosis that no emergency existed
and was therefore misfeasance.71
Acknowledging the importance in tort law of the misfeasancenonfeasance doctrine, the Superior Court rejected the plaintiff's
reasoning, stating that it "beg[ged] the issue.JJ72 The court also
noted the analogy between this case and the common-law rule that
129-31 (1983) (discussion of cases circumventing application of the no-duty rule); Powers,
Hospital Emergency Service and the Open Door, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1455, 1464-75 (1968)
(factual analysis of several cases showing judicial dissatisfaction with the no-duty rule).
62. 54 DeL 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
63. Id. at 16-17, 174 A.2d at 136.
64. Id. at 18, 174 A.2d at 137 (emphasis by the court).
65. ld. at 17, 174 A.2d at 136.
66. Id., 174 A.2d at 136.
67. Id., 174 A.2d at 136.
68. Manlove v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 53 DeL 338, 339, 169 A.2d 18, 19 (DeL Super.
Ct.), rev'd, 54 DeL 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961).
69. 53 DeL at 342, 169 A.2d at 20.
70. Id., 169 A.2d at 20.
71. Id., 169 A.2d at 20.
72. Id., 169 A.2d at 20.
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a private physician is "under no legal duty to accept any person for
treatment, no matter how extreme the emergency.... " 73 Not satisfied with the result, the court proposed an innovative basis for
liability, by reasoning that the hospital should be classified as a
"quasi-public" institution because it received tax exemptions, public subsidies, and a corporate charter under Delaware law.7" These
public benefits were enough to alter the character of a "private"
hospital, such that it "should be required at all times to render
reasonably needed aid in those instances where an emergency involving death or serious bodily impairment might reasonably be
said to exist." 711 Therefore, the Superior Court held that the defendant's nonfeasance theory and analogy to the no-duty rule governing private physicians in an emergency situation failed because
acceptance of public funds and tax benefits "changed [the hospital's] characterization to that of a quasi public [sic] institution,
thereby forfeiting to a measured extent the degree of privacy that
it otherwise possessed. " 76
The Superior Court struggled to find a theoretical basis for
recognizing a duty. By characterizing the hospital as a quasi-public
entity, it obligated the private institution to act in the public interest by providing emergency services. The duty accrued in return
for receipt of public benefits such as tax exemptions and government funding. Whatever the rationale, this theory was shortlived-at least in Delaware.77
B.

The Supreme Court Decision: The Reliance Theory

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the order
of the Superior Court, but rejected its reasoning. 78 In so doing, it
cited Crews, McDonald, and VanCampen-perhaps incorrectlyas supporting the general proposition that "[a] private hospital
owes the public no duty to accept any patient not desired by
73. Id. at 345, 169 A.2d at 21.
74. Id. at 346, 169 A.2d at 22.
75. Id. at 345, 169 A.2d at 22.
76. Id., 169 A.2d at 22.
77. A few courts have used the quasi-public hospital theory to prevent secular hospitals from refusing to provide treatment to achieve "moral" objectives. See, e.g., Doe v.
Bridgeton Hosp. Ass'n, 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641, 647 (1976) (nonsectarian, nonprofit hospital may not refuse abortion services).
78. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del. 15, 27, 174 A.2d 135, 141 (1961).
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it. . . ." 79 The court then explicitly stated that receipt of public
funds and exemption from taxation do not convert a privat~ hospital into a public or quasi-public hospital.80 The Delaware Supreme
Court also noted that since a hospital is "privately owned and operated, it would follow logically that its trustees or governing board
alone have the right to determine who shall be admitted to it as
patients. No other rule would be sensible or workable."81
The court distinguished, however, between a duty to accept an
in-patient and a duty to "give treatment in an emergency case, i.e.,
one obviously demanding immediate attention. " 82 The former duty
is nonexistent as to a private hospital, but the latter duty arises,
under a court-fashioned reliance theory, "if the patient has relied
upon a well-established custom of the hospital to render aid in
such a case."83
The Delaware court found this situation analogous84 to the reliance theory set forth in section 323 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, which states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as necessary
for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure
to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm,
or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon
the undertaking. 815

There are, however, problems with the analogy. The Restatement
rule generally means that liability attaches when one has actually
begun to perform some sort of service. In fact, the Restatement
contains a caveat explicitly expressing "no opinion" as to whether
the making of a "gratuitous promise, without in any way ent~ring
upon performance, is a sufficient undertaking to result in liability
79. 54 Del. at 21, 174 A.2d at 138 (quoting 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8, at 345 (1944)).
(citing also Crews and McDonald); id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139 (citing Van Campen). Refer to
notes 21-53 and accompanying text.
80. Id. at 19, 174 A.2d at 137.
81. Id. at 21, 174 A.2d at 138.
82. Id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139.
83. 174 A.2d at 140 (quoted language omitted from the Delaware Reports opinion).
84. 54 Del. at 23, 174 A.2d at 139.
85. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTS § 323 (1965).
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under the rule...." 86
One might question whether "reliance on a well-established
custom" even rises to the level of a "gratuitous promise." The
court, however, found that when a person in need of emergency
care relies on an established custom to render it, "such a refusal
might well result in worsening the condition of the injured person,
because of the time lost in a useless attempt to obtain medical
aid," seeming to parallel the increased-risk-of-harm language in
section 323 (a). 87 Nevertheless, the recurrent issue is the extent to
which performance of the undertaking has started. Therefore, the
court's analogy between the Manlove reliance theory and the Restatement theory is not clear. The court states that the analogy
exists, but does not explain how. 88
The decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware was a turning
point in the search for a common-law duty to treat, representing
the first time that a court went beyond the constraints of both the
traditional tort misfeasance-nonfeasance theory and the requirement of a hospital-patient relationship to find a new basis of
liability.
An analysis of the Manlove test must focus on its four elements: (1) the hospital must maintain an emergency room;89 (2) an
"unmistakable emergency" must exist;90 (3) a well-established custom to render care in such circumstances must be found; 91 and (4)
the injured party must have relied on that custom. 92
The first element states the obvious and is a factual matter. As
to the second, however, the court was less than clear. What constitutes an "unmistakable emergency"? As a secondary issue, who decides if there is an emergency and to what standard of care will he
be held?
The court defined "emergency" as a condition "obviously demanding immediate attention."93 The next question is: Obvious to
whom? The court answered that "someone on behalf of the hospital must make a prima facie decision whether it exists," and the
court recognized that since some hospitals cannot reasonably be
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
54 Del. at 23, 174 A.2d at 139.

Id., 174 A.2d at 139.
Id., 174 A.2d at 139.
Id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139.
Id. at 23, 174 A.2d at 140.
Id., 174 A.2d at 140.
Id. at 22, 174 A.2d at 139.
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expected to have a doctor on duty at all times, a nurse may of
necessity make the decision.9 ' The court found that there must be
"evidence that an experienced nurse should have known that such
symptoms constituted unmistakable evidence of an emergency.' 1911
Does the Manlove test require an actual examination of the
prospective patient by the person making the prima facie decision
as to whether there is an emergency? 96 Again, the answer is unclear
from the language of the opinion. The court does say that, especially in the case of a disease (as opposed to physical injury),
"some degree of experience and knowledge is required" to make
such a judgment.97 One might also assume that without an actual
examination, the emergency nature of a disease is indiscernable.
Yet the court later stated that the question of the nurse's liability
rested on whether she was "derelict in her duty ... in not recognizing an emergency from the symptoms related to her." 98 Furthermore, the court relieved the decisionmaker of liability unless
her decision was "clearly unreasonable."99
One is drawn to the conclusion that although .Manlove attempted to impose some sort of liability on the hospital, the resulting burden on the plaintiff is unreasonably heavy. The plaintiff
must prove that an "unmistakable emergency exist.ed," while the
hospital need only exercise reasonable medical judgment, perhaps
without even the requirement of an examination.
The third and fourth elements of the Manlove test are even
more problematic. What constitutes a "well-established" custom?
How does the plaintiff prove reliance? Manlove indicated that simply having an emergency room may be enough to show a "wellestablished" custom,100 noting that while a private hospital is
under no legal obligation to maintain an emergency room, it has
become "a well-established adjunct to the main business of a hospital.m01 Additionally, the court never really defined reliance. Even
though it asked: "What is standard hospital practice when an applicant for aid seeks medical aid for sickness at the emergency
94. Id. at 24, 174 A.2d at 139.
95. ld. at 25, 174 A.2d at 140.
96. COBRA imposes a duty to perform a screening examination on all who present
themselves to the emergency room. Refer to note 296 infra and accompanying text.
97. 54 Del. at 26, 174 A.2d at 140.
98. Id., 174 A.2d at 141 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 24, 174 A.2d at 140.
100. Id. at 23, 174 A.2d at 139.
101. Id., 174 A.2d at 139.
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ward? ,"102 the court was referring only to the question of who generally determines whether an emergency exists-a nurse or a
doctor. 103
It is questionable whether the Manlove test requires that the
injured person actually prove reliance. The court remanded the
case for a determination as to whether there was an unmistakable
emergency/ 04 but did not ask for, nor define, appropriate evidence
of reliance or a well-established custom. Perhaps simply going to
the emergency room is enough. The language of the opinion, however, imposes liability in the case of an unmistakable emergency "if
the patient has relied upon a well-established custom of the hospital to render aid in such a case,moe> suggesting that something more
must be proved. Another problem is whether reliance is presumed
or ignored as an element when the injured person is brought to the
hospital by ambulance, and perhaps unconscious, as is often the
case in an emergency.
C. The Manlove
Accommodations

Progeny:

Applications,

Limitations

&

Despite these problems, Manlove received acclaim as the answer to the need for a common-law duty to treat. One commentator described it as "a recognition of new public attitudes toward
the issues of health, hospitals, and emergency rooms," and possibly
"the first step toward the establishment of health care as a right,
legally guaranteed to all Americans. " 106 Although this hope seems
overly optimistic, the truth is that the Manlove reliance theory has
done very little to change the case law. Over its twenty-six year
history, Manlove is cited in less than twenty-five court decisions,
successfully in only a few cases. 107 Usually, Manlove is cited for its
traditional negligence analysis; 108 as an example of reliance on a
gratuitous promise; 109 or for the proposition that there is no legal
102. Id. at 26, 174 A.2d at 141.
103. !d., 174 A.2d at 141.
104. !d. at 26-27, 174 A.2d at 141.
105. 174 A.2d at 140 (quoted language omitted from the Delaware Reports opinion).
106. Gold, Emergency Room Medical Treatment: Right or Privilege?, 36 ALB. L. REV.
526, 535 (1972).
107. Refer to notes 112-19 infra and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 54 Del. 235, 245, 176 A.2d 362,
367 (1961) (evidence of skill and care must be proved by expert testimony).
109. See Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 85 Wash. 2d 17, 24, 530 P.2d 277, 281 (1975)
(involving an action for failure to warn of a hazardous condition).
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duty for a hospital to maintain an emergency room. 110 The
Manlove test has also appeared in cases in which the issue was not
a duty to render emergency care; these cases involved negligent
emergency care or improper transfer following admittance as a
;patient.111

1. Successful Application. The Manlove test has been successfully applied in at least one case: Stanturf v. Sipes. 112 In Stanturf v. Sipes, the plaintiff sought treatment for frostbite of his feet,
but the hospital refused treatment because he was unable to pay a
twenty-five dollar fee. After almost a week, another hospital admitted the plaintiff, but both feet required amputation. 113 In reversing
a summary judgment for defendants, the court applied the
Manlove test to show that issues of fact existed. 114 The court found
that the hospital maintained an emergency room and that the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions supported a finding that
plaintiff's condition was an emergency situation.1111
Citing section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
court also noted that the defendant was the only hospital in the
immediate area, and that it was "the long established rule of the
hospital to accept all persons for treatment upon the payment of a
$25 admittance fee." 116 These facts, the court stated, gave the
plaintiff reason to rely on the practice of rendering emergency
care.117 In searching for causation, the court found that the decline
in Mr. Stanturf's condition could have been caused by the delay in
obtaining treatment. 118
Thus, the facts in Stanturf seem to fit the elements of the
Manlove test rather well. Of course, the admission by the hospital
that its policy was to admit anyone offering a twenty-five dollar fee
played a large part in the decision. 119 In the absence of such concrete evidence, reliance may well be more difficult to prove.
Other courts do appear to accept the reliance test without spe110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Schagrin v. Wilmington Medical Center, 304 A.2d 61, 64 (Del Super. Ct. 1973).
Refer to notes 178-96 infra and accompanying text.
447 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. 1969).
447 S.W.2d at 560.
Id. at 562-63.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cifically citing the Manlove opinion. 12° For example, in Valdez v.
Lyman-Roberts Hospital, 121 the decedent was a pregnant woman,
apparently seriously ill, who was turned away from two area hospitals.122 She died upon her return home. 123
Proximate cause was the only issue on appeal, since the defendant hospitals admitted their breach of duty. 124 The court recognized the defendants' negligence, noting the principles embodied
in the Manlove test:
While a private hospital may conduct its business largely as it
sees fit, liability on the part of the hospital may be predicated on
the refusal of service to a patient in the case of an unmistakable
emergency if the patient has relied upon the custom of the hospital to render aid in such a case. 125

The court found that there was evidence in the record of the hospitals' "reputation" of treating emergencies. 128
2. Limitations. The reason for the limited success of
Manlove test probably lies in difficulties with both application and
proof of the various elements. When triggering application of the
test, the plaintiff must prove the presence of an unmistakable
emergency and reliance on a well-established custom. 127 These factors, however, merely establish the duty to treat. Plaintiff must
then prove the remaining elements of a common-law tort action:
breach of duty, consequent harm and proximate cause. 128 Ironically, the very nature of a true emergency may increase the difficulty of proof. 129
120.
841, 844,
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Annot., Liability of Hospital for Refusal to Admit or Treat Patient, 35 A.L.R.3d
846 (1971).
638 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ rerd n.r.e.).
Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 114 n.l.
Id. (relying on Annot., supra note 120, at 841).
Id.
Refer to notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65.
The Manlove court concluded:
If plaintiff cannot adduce evidence showing some incompetency of the nurse,
or some breach of duty or some negligence his case must fail. Like the learned
judge below, we sympathize with the plaintiff in their loss of a child; but this
natural feeling does not permit us to find liability in the absence of satisfactory
evidence.
54 Del. at 26-27, 174 A.2d at 141. Refer also to note 167 infra and accompanying text.
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Hill v. Ohio County 130 is an example of the difficulties encountered in establishing a duty to treat. In Hill, plaintiff's decedent
arrived at the local public hospital concerned about giving birth
before reaching her doctor in lllinois.131 The nurse in charge was
unable to get either the "on-duty" physician or the "on-call" physician to treat an obstetrics case.132 Decedent was referred to other
hospitals, but elected to go home. 133 She gave birth that night, apparently unattended, and called an ambulance in the morning.m
One of the physicians who had refused treatment the night before
instructed the ambulance driver to take the mother and child to
another hospital. 135 The mother was dead on arrival. 136 In the subsequent wrongful death action, the court found that the hospital's
rules were such that no patient could be admitted without an order
from a doctor, and that "[t]he trustees or governing board of a
public hospital alone determine the right of admission to the benefits of the institution, and their discretion in this regard will not be
reviewed by the courts."~ The court also found that no "element
of critical emergency" was apparent. 138
Hill is an example of a major flaw in the Manlove reliance theory. If the condition of a patient fails to reach the level of an
"emergency," then an injured plaintiff cannot use the doctrine.
The Hill court apparently did not characterize labor as a lifethreatening, traumatic, or "unmistakable" emergency.139
Once the emergency is proven, the next hurdle is proof of reliance on a well-established custom. The Delaware Supreme Court
itself provided at least a hint as to what would satisfy this requirement in Vanaman v. Milford Memorial HospitaU~ 0 In Vanaman,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician improperly set
37

130. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 {1972).
131. 468 S.W.2d at 307.
132. /d.
133. /d.
134. /d.
135. Id. at 308.
136. /d.
137. /d. (quoting 40 A~l JuR. 2o Hospitals and Asylums § 12 (1968)).
138. /d. at 309. Noting that the plaintiff relied on Manloue, the court made no mention of the reliance theory nor of any duty ttl trent in nn emergency, but only quoted the
"warning" in Manloue that plaintiff needed to prove "some incompetency of the nurse or
some breach of duty or some negligence." !d. at 308.
139. The COBRA statute specifically includes active labor within its provisions. Refer
to note 296 infra and accompanying text.
140. 272 A.2d 718 (Del. Sup. 1970).
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her left leg in a cast which was too tight and caused permanent
injury. 141 The main issue on appeal was whether the hospital was
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, even though the
physician was not its employee. 142 Did the hospital represent that
the physician was its agent or did it merely "refer" the plaintiff to
the physician, on call in the emergency room ?143 If the hospital
merely made a "referral" to the physician as an independent contractor, it avoided liability.144
The plaintiff in Vanaman was actually treated, so Manlove
appears to be inapplicable. The court cited Manlove, however, and
noted that the plaintiff offered evidence establishing that the hospital "maintained an emergency facility [and] that facility was offered to the public and the public was directed to it.m•c; Although
this evidence appears extraneous, it takes on significance in light of
the fact that the issue was whether the hospital was liable at all for
plaintiff's treatment. The plaintiff attempted to establish the hospital's liability for treatment received there, irrespective of
whether it was provided by an independent contractor or by an
employee. Although the court's holding did not rely on this theory,
it offered a strong hint as to what might satisfy the "reliance on a
well-established custom" requirement of the Manlove test.
A Pennsylvania court's decision in Fabian v. Matzko 146 is perhaps the best example of a court's confusion over the Manlove reliance test. 147 In Fabian, the plaintiff developed "an intense and
sudden headache, stiffness in her neck, and nausea. " 148 Her personal physician examined her and determined that she had a viral
infection. 149 When her condition had not improved several hours
later, her husband called the hospital and spoke with the emergency room physician, relating his wife's symptoms and indicating
141. I d. at 719. Factually, the case was a modern day McDonald. Refer to notes 21·23
supra and accompanying text.

142. 272 A.2d at 719. Refer to note 8 supra.
143. 272 A.2d at 720.
144. Id.
145. I d. at 720-21. In a footnote, the court referred to the deposition of the hospital's
administrator, who was questioned concerning the separate status of the emergency room,
its availability to the general public, and whether the hospital posted and maintained signs
and directions to the emergency unit. ld. at 721 n.4.
146. 236 Pa. Super. 267, 344 A.2d 569 (1975).
147. The majority, a concurrence and a dissent offered conflicting views of its proper
application.
148. ld. at 269, 344 A.2d at 570.
149. ld., 344 A.2d at 570.
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that he wanted her admitted to the hospital. 1110 In accordance with
hospital policy, the emergency room physician asked if the plaintiff
had seen a physician, and informed the husband that she could not
be admitted unless the arrangements were made by their personal
physician. 151 The husband tried, but was unable, to contact their
doctor. 152
Over the next several days, the plaintiff's condition seemed to
improve, but she then suffered another attack and was admitted to
the hospital by her physician. 153 An examination revealed a "cerebral hemorrhage with permanent brain damage, loss of speech,
partial paralysis, loss of hearing and loss of vision. mM The plaintiff
alleged that the injuries were caused by the hospital's negligence in
failing to admit and treat her, relying on Manlove and section 323
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 1115
The court first rejected section 323 as a basis for liability, stating that the emergency room physician never undertook to render
medical services. 156 The court then considered the A1anlove and
Stanturf 57 decisions, characterizing them as "concerned with the
fact that a person in need of immediate medical care uses valuable
time when he goes to an emergency facility.m 118 The court found
the Manlove test inapplicable, stating:
In the present case, appellant did not rely on a policy of render-

ing emergency care. Appellant did not go to the hospital, and
thus did not waste valuable time. Furthermore, this was not an
unmistakable emergency. In fact, there were no facts which would
have indicated to Dr. Cahill that this was an emergency situation. . . . Finally the hospital in this case did not depart from
one of its standard procedures, as did the hospital in Stantur{. 111 D

Given that the plaintiff never actually went to the emergency
room, one can understand why the court was reluctant to hold the
hospital liable.
Fabian is otherwise factually comparable to Manlove, but il150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157158.
159.

Id., 344 A.2d at 570.
Id., 344 A.2d at 570.
Id., 344 A.2d at 570.
Id., 344 A.2d at 570.
Id. at 269-70, 344 A.2d at 570.
Id. at 270, 344 A.2d at 571.
Jd., 344 A.2d at 570.

Refer to notes 112-19 supra and accompanying text.
236 Pa. Super. at 271-72, 344 A.2d at 572.
Id. at 273, 344 A.2d at 572.
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lustrative of the limitations of applying the reliance test. First,
does "valuable time" refer to the time it takes to drive to and apply for treatment at the emergency room or to the time lost in not
seeking further aid? 160 Of course, since the plaintiffs did not actually go to the hospital, the emergency room physician had no
chance to examine the plaintiff. The lack of an opportunity to examine is the legitimate reason for the court's refusal to impose liability. The question left open in Manlove, however, becomes pertinent here. Is there a duty to actually examine a patient in
determining the presence or absence of an emergency, 161 or are
symptoms related by a third party sufficient? Perhaps the courts
are afraid to impose such a requirement because an examination
may be enough to establish a relationship with the patient. 162 Once
the relationship is established, a duty to the patient is also
established. 163
In addition, the Fabian court appears to have misinterpreted
the Manlove requirements for proving reliance. The court found
that the Manlove test was based on the concern that "the injured
person's condition will deteriorate because he relied on the hospi160. The dissent notes that the plaintiff was told, "[y]ou are not a doctor to make a
diagnosis; if your doctor said it is a virus, it is a virus." /d. at 278, 344 A.2d at 575. Was not
valuable time lost in a reassurance that an apparently serious condition was only a virus?
161. Another problem with the Fabian court's analysis lies in its assertion that no
unmistakable emergency was apparent. Both the concurrence and the dissent agreed that
this was a jury question. 236 Pa. Super. at 273, 277, 344 A.2d at 572, 576.
162. Refer to the discussion of Richard v. Adair Hosp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791
(Ky. App. 1978) in notes 199-208 infra and accompanying text.
163. As noted above, the concurring judge agreed with the dissent that an emergency
may have been present, but based his concurrence on the finding that the emergency room
physician did not undertake to render medical care via the phone call. In other words, no
"sufficient relationship" was established. 236 Pa. Super. at 276, 344 A.2d at 574. This reu·
soning is more plausible than the majority opinion, but it comes very close to reverting to
the common-law rule that a private hospital may refuse to establish any relationship and
will thereby not be held liable.
The dissent, on the other hand, found that it was at least possible that the emergency
room physician undertook to establish a relationship by "confirming [a] medical diagnosis
based upon an evaluation of the recited symptoms." /d. at 279, 344 A.2d at 575. This is
reminiscent of the O'Neill court's attempt to find a hospital-patient relationship via a
nurse's phone call on behalf of the patient. Refer to notes 54-60 supra and accompanying
text. The dissent also found that the rule relied upon by the plaintiffs was that a "hospital
which maintains an emergency room is under a duty to recognize and respond to a genuine
medical emergency." 236 Pa. Super. at 276, 344 A.2d at 575. This characterization, of course,
ignores the reliance element of the Manlove test.
The COBRA statute requires an examination of the patient to determine if an emer·
gency condition exists. Refer to note 296 infra and accompanying text.
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tal's policy of rendering emergency care."184 With these words, the
court incorporated a fact in Stanturf 6 r. as a requirement in meeting the reliance test. Reliance on a well-established custom to
render aid may be very different from reliance on a particular hospital's admitted policy to render aid in emergencies. A policy may
serve as evidence of a custom, but the requirement that a policy be
in existence and subsequently broken narrows the .Manlove test almost to an impossibility. Further, the hospital policy in Fabianno admittance. except by personal physician-is the same policy
evidenced in Manlove and common to many hospitals
nationwide. 188
Even if the plaintiff establishes a duty under Jt.fanlove and its
breach, he still has the difficult burden of proving causation. Ruvio
v. North Broward Hospital District161 illustrates the problem.
Ruvio sought admission to North Broward Hospital two days after
suffering a coronary infarction, but was told that he was not an
emergency case and could be admitted only under doctor's orders.188 After leaving the hospital, Ruvio went to his physician's
office and made arrangements for his immediate admittance. 109
Ruvio was, in fact, in an emergency condition and died 48 hours
after his admission to the hospital. 110
The wrongful death action claimed the hospital had wrongfully refused Ruvio admission, and the focus on appeal was proximate cause.171 There was expert testimony on the record that the
delay in admission would not have made any difference in Ruvio's
condition. The court held that the plaintiff, Ruvio's widow, "failed
to establish that any action or inaction on the part of the hospital
was the proximate cause of the death . . . or that there was any
breach of duty on the part of the hospital staff."172 The court then
cited Manlove, stating that "[t]he same conclusion was reached in
164.
165.
text.
166.
text.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

236 Pa. Super. at 272, 344 A.2d at 572 (emphasis added).
447 S.W.2d at 562 (Mo. 1969). Refer to notes 112-19 supra and accompan}ing

Manlove, 54 Del at 17, 174 A.2d at 136. Refer to note 8 supra and accompanying
186 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 195 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1966).
186 So. 2d at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46.
ld.
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a case involving similar circumstances."173
The court's statement is somewhat puzzling. Obviously, the
overall conclusions reached in Manlove and Ruvio are different,
since Manlove was remanded to determine if an unmistakable
emergency existed. 174 The Florida court seems to refer to the following language in Manlove:
We should add, however, that if plaintiff cannot adduce evidence
showing some incompetency of the nurse, or some breach of duty
or some negligence, his case must fail. . . . [W]e sympathize with
the parents in their loss . . . but this natural feeling does not permit us to find liability in the absence of satisfactory evidence.m

Thus, a plaintiff's burden of proving an unmistakable emergency and reliance on a well-established custom is just the beginning. She must then prove that the refusal to treat caused or aggravated the harm. In emergencies, particularly where death
results, such evidence may be very difficult to establish.

3. Accommodations: Capturing the 11Spirit" of Manlove. Because of, or perhaps in spite of, the problems of application, some
courts have cited Manlove in order to find a duty to provide emergency care; but they have disregarded the finer points of the reliance test, as evidenced by the use of Manlove in cases in which the
patient was legally admitted. 176 Mter finding an existing hospitalpatient relationship, these courts declined to discuss reliance on a
well-established custom, leaving unclear whether these courts
would have required reliance in the absence of such admission. 177
For example, soon after Manlove was decided, a Mississippi
court faced a compelling set of facts in New Biloxi Hospital, Inc. v.
Frazier. 178 A black179 veteran was rushed by ambulance to the
173. ld.
174. 54 Del. at 26, F4 A.2d at 141.
175. 54 Del. at 26-27, 174 A.2d at 141.
176. See, e.g., LeJuene Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So. 2d 202, 204 n.5 (Fin. Dist.
Ct. App. 1965); New Biloxi Hosp., Inc. v. Frazier, 245 Miss. 185, 186, 146 So. 2d 882, 887-88
(1962). Refer to notes 185-86, 196, 207 & 212 infra and accompanying text.
177. Refer to notes 188 & 195 infra and accompanying text.
178. 245 Miss. 185, 146 So. 2d 882 (1962).
179. Racism, as well as economic factors, plays a role in the denial of care. Sec gcncr·
ally Equal Access, supra note 2, at 3-4 (majority of dumped patients are minorities). Fra·
zier preceded the passage of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§601, 78 Stat. 252-53 (1982), but later cases have raised racial discrimination claims without
success. See, e.g., Campbell v. Mincey, 413 F. Supp. 16, 21 (N.D. Miss. 1975) (plaintiff's race
and indigency unrelated to hospital's refusal to treat), a/f'd, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976).
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emergency room, bleeding profusely from a gunshot wound. 180 The
nurse took his blood pressure and pulse and summoned the doctor,
neglecting to inform the doctor of the amount of blood lost.181 The
doctor arranged for transfer to a Veteran's Administration hospital.182 Meanwhile, the wounded veteran lapsed into shock after two
hours in the emergency room. 183 The doctor did nothing to stop
the bleeding, and the veteran died shortly after the transfer to the
V.A. hospital. 184
In the wrongful death action, the court found that the hospital
received and recorded the veteran as an emergency room patient.185 Citing numerous cases, including Manlove and O'Neill, the
court stated, "Under such circumstances, the [h]ospital and its employees had a duty to use reasonable care in protecting his life and
well-being. 11186
Under the facts of Frazier, the Manlove reliance theory was
not dispositive. Frazier was a negligence case and the evidence
supported the holding that the decedant bled to death in the hospital's emergency room due to the negligence of the hospital's
nurses and doctor. 187 The court found that a hospital-patient relationship existed concurrently with the duty to provide reasonable
care under the circumstances. 186
A similar analysis appears in LeJuene Road Hospital, Inc. v.
Watson. 169 A mother, on the advice of her doctor, took her minor
son to the hospital for an operation to remove his appendix. 100 The
boy was taken upstairs to the examining room, undressed, examined and given medication. 191 Mter two hours, a hospital employee required them to leave, apparently because of their inability
Refer to notes 233-41 infra and accompanying text.
180. 245 Miss. at 193, 146 So. 2d at 885.
181. Id., 146 So. 2d at 885-86.
182. Id. at 195, 146 So. 2d at 886.
183. Id. at 194, 146 So. 2d at 886.
184. Id., 146 So. 2d at 886.
185. Id., 146 So. 2d at 887.
186. Id. at 198, 146 So. 2d at 887-88 (citing, among other sources, both Wilmington
Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 DeL 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961), and O'Neill v. Montefiore Hasp., 11
A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960)).
187. Id. at 195, 146 So. 2d at 886.
188. Id. at 198, 146 So. 2d at 887.
189. 171 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
190. Id. at 203.
191. /d.
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to pay a two hundred dollar admittance fee. 192 The child was
transferred to a public hospital for the necessary operation. 193
In the wrongful discharge suit, the court first miscited Crews
for the proposition that "it is permissible for a private hospital to
reject for whatever reason, or no reason at all, any applicant for
medical and hospital services."~ 9 " The court then distinguished the
case at bar on the fact that the hospital physically and "legally
admitted" the boy, establishing a basis for liability. 19 c;
Watson does not appear to rely on Manlove, but the court refers the reader to the Delaware decision in a puzzling footnote, and
declines to discuss a hospital's obligation to an emergency patient.196 Rather than depend on the Manlove reliance test, which
the court could have applied, it apparently felt safer characterizing
the facts as an admission and applying traditional negligence
terms.
Other courts have found a duty to treat emergencies in cases
lacking evidence of a hospital-patient relationship. 197 These courts,
accepting the "spirit" of Manlove, make no mention of, nor require
reliance on a well-established custom.198
In Richard v. Adair Hospital Foundation Corp., 199 the plaintiff brought his daughter to the emergency room twice in one day,
leaving without treatment each time. 200 The nurse first declined to
examine the infant, but on the second trip felt her head before
deciding there was no emergency. 201 The child's condition worsened and the next day another hospital admitted her. 202 The diagnosis was bronchial pneumonia and although the hospital adminis192. ld.
193. ld.
194. ld. (citing Birmingham Baptist Hasp. v. Crews, 229 Ala. 398, 157 So. 224 (1934)
(private hospital owes no duty to admit contagious patient in violation of its rules)).
195. Refer to note 61 supra.
196. 171 So. 2d at 203-04 n.5 "what has been said above [distinguishing Crews and
finding an admission to the hospital] does not in any way affect a hospital's obligation when
presented with an emergency patient. For an excellent discussion of the law applicable
thereto, see Wilmington General Hospital v. Manlove."
197. See, e.g., Richard v. Adair Hasp. Found. Corp., 566 S.W.2d 791,792 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978); Mercy Medical Center of Oshkosh, Inc. v. Winnebago County, 58 Wis. 2d 260, 263,
206 N.W.2d 198, 200-01 (1973).
198. Refer to notes 199-212 infra and accompanying text.
199. 566 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978).
200. Id. at 792.
201. ld.
202. Id.
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tered emergency treatment, she died within five hours. 203
In the wrongful death action, an expert testified that the
child's chances of recovery would have been substantially greater
had she been treated earlier. 20' In reversing a summary judgment
for the defendant, the court stated that "[i]n a non-emergency situation there is no duty on the part of a county hospital to admit or
treat a patient...." 205 The court recognized an exception to the
general rule in the case of emergencies, citing Manlove for the proposition that pneumonia may rise to the level of an emergency situation.208 The court left the ultimate question of liability to the
jury.207
Richard fails to mention reliance or a custom to render emergency care, noting only that liability may be predicated on refusal
to treat in an emergency situation and that pneumonia was an
emergency under the circumstances.208 The court was obviously
less concerned with requiring proof of a well-established custom
than with accepting the moral and ethical basis, or the "spirit," of
Manlove.
The "spirit" of Manlove possessed the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Mercy Medical Center v. Winnebago County.209 The case
was an action to recover the cost of emergency hospital treatment
from the county.210 Holding the county liable, the court discussed
the patient,.s right to treatment.211 Citing Manlove and recounting
essentially the entire history of the issue, the court concluded:
[T]he courts holding a hospital liable for failure to give emergency treatment are still in the minority. . . . We think, however,
that today, without [sic] our society's emphasis upon a concern
for the health of its citizens, private hospitals with emergency
wards and facilities for emergency services have a duty to admit
those in need of aid. It would shock the public conscience if a
person in need of medical emergency aid would be turned down
at the door of a hospital having emergency service because that
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 793.
206. Id.
207. Id. (the question was "whether appellee was negligent in twice refusing hospital
admission to the infant ... when an unmistakable situation may have existed").
208. Id.
209. 58 Wis. 2d 260, 206 N.W.2d 198 (1973).
210. Id. at 261, 206 N.W.2d at 198.
211. Id. at 262, 206 N.W.2d at 200-01.
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person could not at that moment assure payment for the service.
The public expects such service. . . .212

While certain jurisdictions have cited Manlove for one proposition or another, the reliance test did not significantly expand
the duty to treat in an emergency. Contrary to the predictions,
Manlove did not gain nationwide judicial acceptance as an enforcement tool to expand the right to emergency care.
III.

THE GUERRERO CASE: THE SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE
THEORY

In 1975, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily rejected the
Manlove theory, embraced by the Arizona Court of Appeals, 213 and
replaced it with a theory of its own. In Guerrero v. Copper Queen
Hospital, 214 two children received severe burns when a stove exploded in their home in Mexico.2111 The Guerreros brought them
for treatment to the Copper Queen Hospital, located close to the
Mexican border. 216 The hospital refused treatment, forcing a trip
to another hospital.217 The children sued through a guardian ad
litem, alleging that the delay in treatment caused them to suffer
additional injury and prolonged convalescence.218
The Guerreros urged the court to adopt the rule set forth in
Manlove. 219 The defendants asserted the common-law rule that a
private hospital is under no obligation to accept any patient. 220
The court found the parties' reliance on either rule misplaced,
holding that "[a] private hospital has no duty to accept a patient
or serve everyone unless a different public policy has been declared
by statute or otherwise."221
The court then advanced an argument neither briefed nor argued by the plaintiffs,222 borrowing from the theoretical basis of
212. ld. at 267-68, 206 N.W.2d at 201.
213. 22 Ariz. App. 611, 612, 529 P.2d 1205, 1206 (1974).
214. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975).
215. ld. at 105, 537 P.2d at 1330.
216. ld., 537 P.2d at 1330.
217. Id., 537 P.2d at 1330.
218. ld., 537 P.2d at 1330.
219. ld., 537 P.2d at 1330.
220. ld. at 105-06, 537 P.2d at 1330-31. The hospital was a division of the Phelps
Dodge Corporation. ld. at 105, 537 P.2d at 1330.
221. ld. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 107, 537 P.2d at 1332 (Struckmeyer, C.J., concurring).
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the Superior Court opinion in Manlove. 223 The court found that
"[t]he character of private hospitals in Arizona has been changed
by statute and regulations." 224 The court noted that privat~ hospitals must be licensed by the state to operate, that the state board
of health had authority to adopt rules and regulations for licensed
hospitals, and that since 1964 regulations required a general hospital to maintain an emergency room. 2211 Thus, the court held that
Arizona public policy required a general hospital to maintain facilities for the provision of emergency care, and "that such a hospital
may not deny emergency care without cause."226
With this duty clearly established, the court rejected the hospital's attempt to come within the protection of Arizona's Good
Samaritan statute, which immunizes individuals from liability for
withholding aid in emergency situations.227 The court held the
statute inapplicable to emergency medical treatment, since the
hospital had a public duty to provide emergency services.228
Guerrero offers an alternative theory for establishing a duty to
treat emergencies. Arizona licensing laws altered the common-law
no-duty rule by requiring the maintenance of emergency services
for the public benefit, without regard for ability to pay. Because
the Manlove theory garnered only limited acceptance nationwide,
and because the hospital industry was highly regulated, numerous
statutes, regulations, and bylaws existed on which to base this theory of liability.
In Thompson v. Sun City Community Hospital, /nc., 229 the
Arizona Supreme Court affirmed and expanded Guerrero. 230 The
opinion reiterated the rule that "licensed hospitals in this state are
required to accept and r~nder emergency care to all patients who
223. Refer to notes 68-76 supra and accompanying text.
224. 112 Ariz. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331.
225. Id., 537 P.2d at 1331.
226. Id., 537 P.2d at 1331. The concurring opinion urged the acceptance or the
Manlove rule, arguing that the majority's statutory argument was not properly raised in the
lower court and should not serve as the basis for the decision. Id. at 107, 537 P.2d at 1332
(Struckmeyer, C.J., concurring).
227. Id. at 106, 537 P.2d at 1331.
228. I d., 537 P.2d at 1331. For further discussion of the application or Good Samaritan
laws to emergency room settings, refer to notes 355-63 infra and accompanying text229. 141 Ariz. 597, 688 P.2d 605 (1984).
230. Id. at 602, 688 P.2d at 610. See also Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 611, 617
P.2d 774, 777 (1980) (physician contractually bound to bylaws and rules or hospital obligated to treat emergency room patients).
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present themselves in need of such care."231 It further established
that in Arizona, there are only three possible defenses to the denial
of emergency care: (1) the hospital is not obligated or capable
under its state license to provide the needed emergency care; (2)
there is a valid medical cause to refuse emergency care; or (3)
there is no true emergency. 232
The Guerrero approach has met with less success in other jurisdictions. An example is Campbell v. Mincey,233 decided shortly
after Guerrero. The plaintiff was a black woman, in labor, who was
refused treatment by Marshall County Hospital. 234 She gave birth
to her son in the hospital parking lot, in the front seat of a neighbor's car. 235 Plaintiff based her claim, in part, on the violation of
certain state statutes which mainly dealt with the licensing requirements for Mississippi hospitals. 236 The court, however, found
that these statutes were "irrelevant to the issues litigated in the
cause." 237 The one statute the court did find "germane" to the issues required hospitals to comply with certain rules and regulations promulgated by the Mississippi Commission on Hospital
Care or face revocation of their licenses. 238 The court decided, however, that the regulations imposed duties only upon the hospital,
and not its managers or employees. 239 The hospital was not a party
defendant to the suit. 240
The Campbell court also recognized a common-law "trend" toward imposing liability on hospitals for refusing to treat in emergency situations, but found that these cases all involved an arbitrary refusal to treat which was a
marked departure from previous hospital custom and procedure.
The refusal of the staff of the Marshall County hospital to admit
or treat the plaintiffs here was in compliance with, rather than a
departure from hospital policy not to admit patients who are not
231. 141 Ariz. at 602, 688 P.2d at 610.
232. Id. at 603, 688 P.2d at 611.
233. 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd mem, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1976).
234. 413 F. Supp. at 18.
235. Id. at 19.
236. !d. The plaintiff also alleged racial discrimination, but the court rejected her con·
tention as against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 21-22.
237. ld. at 19.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. ld. at 20.
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referred by local physicians.241

In making this statement, the court is simply ·wrong, or at
least confused. Several cases following the "trend" involved hospitals with an admittance policy similar to that of Marshall County
Hospital.242 Admittance as an in-patient following emergency
treatment was not an issue.
In addition, the Campbell court emphasized that no physical
harm or injury resulted to either plaintiff or her son, which the
court considered as proof that there was not an emergency.243 The
birth was "normal in all respects other than the location and the
absence of a doctor at the immediate time of the birth."244 Therefore, the plaintiff's active labor was not a "true" emergency, and
hospital admission regulations were inapplicable under the circumstances.245 Campbell was a major set back for legal advocates who
hoped that Campbell would further the trend toward establishing
a duty to provide emergency care.
In fact, the Guerrero approach had little impact outside Arizona.246 Also, while Guerrero did not involve the same application
problems that plagued the Manlove test, it required courts to
make the leap from statutes and regulations-designating certain
standards for hospital licensing-to a duty to treat any and all persons in need of emergency care, based on broad public policy concerns. Morally, the connection is desirable, but legally, it required
the creation of a private cause of action implied from state licensing statutes. Particularly in light of the perceived malpractice "crisis" in the mid-1970s, courts may have been reluctant to expand
duties without specific guidance from the legislature.
IV.

STATE LAw AND FEDERAL HILL-BURTON: Ln~uTED IMPACT

A. State Legislation

Almost half of the states have legislation requiring hospitals to
241. Id. at 20.
242. See, e.g., Manlove, 54 Del. at 17, 174 A.2d at 136; Hill, 468 S.W.2d at 308;
Fabian, 236 Pa. Super. at 269, 344 A.2d at 570. Refer to notes 65, 137 & 151 supra and
accompanying text.
243. 413 F. Supp. at 21.
244. Id. at 19.
245. Id. at 22-23.
246. The reason is not completely clear, but may be due to the fact that Guerrero
depended on Arizona statutory policy with little precedential value elsewhere.
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provide emergency care regardless of ability to pay, some requiring
that patients be in stable condition before transfer to another
hospital. 247
As early as 1927, Illinois law required that every licensed hospital "which provides general medical and surgical hospital services shall provide a hospital emergency service . . . and shall furnish such hospital emergency services to any applicant who applies
for the same in case of injury or acute medical condition where the
same is liable to cause death or severe injury or serious illness. " 248
This statute has never been successfully applied to establish a private cause of action for failure to treat a patient.249 Furthermore,
the law lacks effective public enforcement. Cook County Hospital
physicians continue to report an increase in "dumping" of emergency patients from the private hospitals in Chicago. 2 G0
In recent years, a few states have passed "antidumping" laws
requiring hospitals to give emergency room patients the care necessary to stabilize their condition and regulating the manner of
transfer from one hospital to another, regardless of ability to
pay. 251 The various approaches include providing for notice to pa247. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 1317, 1317.2-.2a, 1798.170-.172 (West
Supp. 1988); CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 26-15-101 to -104, -106 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
395.0143-.0145, 401.45 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-40 to -46 (1985);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 321-232(b) (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2168.400(1)-.990(3) (Michie/
Hobbs-Merrill 1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.2113.4(A)-(B), -2113.6 (West Supp. 1988);
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 70E(k), (n) (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 333.20703, -.20704(4), -.20715 (West Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-39-301, 302, -511(12) (1987); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4438a (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CoDE
ANN. §§ 26-8-2(11), -811) (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.301 (West Supp. 1987); Wvo. STAT. §
35-2-115(a) (1977).
248. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111 Y2, para. 86 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
249. In Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1979), the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that the statute did not impose a duty upon a hospital to
assume responsibility for the practice of medicine within an independently operated emergency room. 399 N.E.2d at 203. The refusal of treatment actually occurred, however, after
the hospital admitted the patient. ld. at 200. The suit also alleged a claim of negligent
emergency room care. ld. at 204.
Other cases discussing the statute deal only with questions of payment for an indigent's
emergency care. Methodist Medical Center v. Ingram, 82 Ill. 2d 511, 413 N.E.2d 402, 406
(1980); Lazzara v. Dreyer Medical Clinic, 120 Ill. App. 3d 721, 458 N.E.2d 958, 960-61
(1983); Gasbarra v. St. James Hosp., 85 Ill. App. 3d 32, 406 N.E.2d 544, 551-52 (1979); St.
John's Hosp. of the Hosp. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis v. Town of Capital, 75
Ill. App. 2d 222, 226, 220 N.E.2d 333, 335 (1966).
250. Ansell & Schiff, Patient Dumping, 257 J. AMA. 1500, 1500 (1987).
251. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE §§ 1317, 1317.2-.2a, 1798.170,-.172 (West Supp.
1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0144 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.2113.6(C)
(West Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CoDE ANN. § 19-308.2 (1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.

HeinOnline -- 26 Hous. L. Rev. 54 1989

1989]

EMERGENCY CARE

55

tients of their rights to treatment; strengthening enforcement
mechanisms, including private causes of action; and creating penalties for failure to comply. 252
A few state approaches are illustrative. In Massachusetts, the
"Patient's Bill of Rights" provides a right to prompt life-saving
treatment in an emergency regardless of ability to pay.2113 Therequirement to provide this care is extended to both the health care
facility and the physician in the facility. 2114 Treatment may not be
delayed to discuss payment if such delay imposes material risk to
the potential patient.255 A recent amendment to this law provides
the patient with a right to "prompt and safe transfer to a facility
which agrees to receive and treat such patient.mna The statute recognizes that a private cause of action may be filed by a person
whose rights have been violated.257 The statute makes no clear provision for state-imposed penalties.258
California recently passed comprehensive legislation that mandates all licensed health care facilities with emergency departments to provide emergency services to any person requesting care
for an emergency condition.259 The emergency services shall be
rendered without first questioning the person about his or her ability to pay.26° Further, the statute provides for the recovery of
"damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and other appropriat-e relier'
in a civil action. 261 The health facility, its employees and physicians, dentists, and podiatrists, however, shall not be liable if the
refusal of services "is based on the determination, exercising reasonable care, that the person is not suffering from an emergency
medical condition . . . ." 262
ch. 111, § 70E(n) (West Supp. 1988); 35 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 449.8(a) (Purdon Supp.
1988); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 68-11-701 to -705 (1987); TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. nrt. 4437f, §§
5(b) & (d), 9c (Vernon Supp. 1988).
252. Waxman & Dorn, States Take the Lead in Preuenting Patient Dumping, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 136, 136 (1988).
253. !\.1Ass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (West 1983 & Supp. 1988).
254. Id. §§ 70E(a) & (k).
255. Id. § 70E(k).
256. Id. § 70E(n).
257. Id. § 70E.
258. Id.
259. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 1317(a) (West Supp. 1988).
260. Id. § 1317(d).
261. Id. § 1317.6(f).
262. Id. § 1317.6(g). Florida recently adopted a similar emergency cnrc statute. FLA.
STAT. ANN.§ 395.0144 (West Supp. 1988).
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In Texas, state law provides that all general hospitals must
provide emergency services to patients regardless of ability to
pay.263 The Texas Hospital Licensing Law and its implementing
regulations also provide comprehensive emergency transfer standards.264 A strict enforcement scheme allows any person harmed by
the failure of a hospital "to timely adopt, implement, or enforce a
patient transfer policy" to seek injunctive relief or "remedies for
civil damages existing under current common law." 265
Most state laws, however, do not recognize the right of an injured party to sue the hospital for failure to comply. Without express statutory authority, courts are reluctant to create such a
right. For example, New York has a statute requiring general hospitals to admit and provide emergency medical treatment to all in
immediate need, without advance payment or questioning as to
payment. 266 In Quijije v. Lutheran Medical Center,267 the plaintiff
sued a public hospital for failure to "render timely medical treatment to plaintiffs' infant daughter when advance payment therefore could not be made. " 268 The court struck down a motion to
amend the complaint and assert a cause of action on behalf of the
mother, individually, for emotional distress arising from observing
the suffering and death of her baby.269 In asserting the additional
cause of action, the mother relied on the statute noted above, but
the court held that it provided an insufficient basis for the claim,
noting that "if [the statute] creates any specific duty at all, such
duty would run from the hospital to the individual needing medical care. m 7 o
In fact, most state laws have limited enforcement potential.
First, many laws still lack implementing regulations. The definition of an emergency lacks clarity or is defined too narrowly. Many
state laws do not address the problems of transfer that arise from a
lack of appropriate services, and most laws allow transfer after
"stabilization," a term often used to justify economic, not medical,
263. TEx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 4438a (Vernon Supp. 1988).
264. ld. art. 4437f, §§ 5(b)-(d), 9c (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1988).
265. ld. § 9c.
266. N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 2805-b (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1987). See also People
v. Flushing Hosp. & Medical Center, 122 Misc. 2d 260, 471 N.Y.S. 2d 745 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1983).
267. 92 A.D.2d 935; 460 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
268. ld. at 935, 460 N.Y.S. 2d at 600.
269. ld. at 935-36, 460 N.W.S.2d at 600-01.
270. Id. at 936, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
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reasons. 271 In addition, state laws experience little meaningful enforcement. Only a few states levy fines, usually minimal, for violations.272 Given the failure of the common law and most state legislation to uniformly mandate a duty, can federal legislation provide
the solution?

B. Hill-Burton: An Ineffective Approach
With its passage in 1946, the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, commonly referred to as the Hill-Burton Act, provided
federal funds for the construction and modernization of public and
private nonprofit health care facilities. 273 Over half the hospitals
nationwide received assistance. 274 In consideration for funds, HillBurton hospitals must provide a certain percentage of uncompensatec~ care for twenty years and continue to satisfy certain community service obligations.2711
The community service obligations prevent a Hill-Burton facility from denying emergency services to any person who resides,
or for Title XVI facilities, works, in the facility's service area because that person is unable to pay.276 A facility may discharge or
transfer a person to another facility for necessary treatment only
after appropriate personnel determine that the transfer will not
subject the person to a substantial risk of deterioration in medical
condition.277
271. See Ansell & Schiff, supra note 250, at 1500-02; see also Equal Access, supra
note 2, at 106 (statement of Arnold Reiman, M.D., Editor, NEw ENGLAND JoURNAL OP
MEDICINE).
272. Dowell, Indigent Access to Hospital Emergency Room Services, 18 CLEARING·
HOUSE REV. 483, 487 (1984).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982); 42 C.F.R. § 124 (1979).
274. Dowell, supra note 272, at 487.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982); see generally Wing, The Community Service Obligation of Hill-Burton Health Facilities, 23 B.C.L. REv. 577, 597 (1982) ("[T]o conclude •.•
that Congress could not have intended to condition receipt of funds on the provision of
either uncompensated service or ... community service, is simply a leap or logic not justified by any reading of the legislative history •.••").The 20-year limitation is not expressly
part of the statute. American Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170, 181 (7th Cir. 1933).
276. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603 (1979).
277. Id. The regulations do not define the term "emergency," but the Office or Civil
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides in its policy manual that emergency services are those "necessary to prevent the death or serious
impairment of the health of the individual." DEPARTMENT OP HEALTII & HUMAN SERVICES,
OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, A GumE TO PLANNING THE HILL-BURTON CoMMUNm' SERVICE CoMPLIANCE REVIEw 31 & Tab B (1981) [hereinafter OCR COMMUNITY SERVICE GUIDE) (cited in
A. FREIFIELD, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE: AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO TilE HILL-BURTON UN-
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Inability to pay is not a valid reason for denying emergency
service, nor is the fact that the person does not have a physician
with admitting privileges at the Hill-Burton facility. 278 Appropriate
hospital personnel must at least make a sufficient appraisal of the
person's condition before denying emergency services or transfering the patient. 279
Until the early 1970s, however, hospitals basically ignored
community service obligations. Legal service advocates looked to
Hill-Burton obligations as a new source of access for the poor into
the emergency room. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital 280 established that the Hill-Burton Act did, in fact, mandate community service obligations.281 Unlike the uncompensated care obligation, no durational limit attached to community service, including
the provision of emergency services. 282 In 1983, the Seventh Circuit,
in American Hospital Association v. Schweiker, 283 finally affirmed
the current regulations, originally issued in 1979, mandating a continuing obligation to provide community service, including emergency care services to all in a hospital's area, regardless of ability
COMPENSATED CARE AND CoMMUNITY SERVICES REQUIREMENTS 40 (National Health Law Pro·
gram 1986) [hereinafter ADvocATE's GuiDE]). Furthermore, the OCR COMMUNITY SERVICE
GUIDE clarifies that pregnant women who present themselves at an emergency room should
be accepted for treatment "as soon as labor is established." OCR COMMUNITY SERVICE
GUIDE, supra, at Tab B. In at least two compliance actions, the Office of Civil Rights hold
that Hill-Burton hospitals cannot deny service because the women received little or no pronatal care. In re Johnston Memorial Hosp., HHS/OCR No. 03813146 (Abingdon, Va., Apr. 7,
1983); In re St. Francis Hosp. & Medical Center, HHS/OCR No. 07823004 (Topeka, Kan.,
Oct. 29, 1982) (as reported in ADvocATE's GuiDE, supra, at 43-44, 81 n.59). Additionally, an
examination is required before denial even if the hospital alleges that treatment is unnecessary or unavailable. See ADVOCATE's GUIDE, supra, at 40-44.
278. 42 C.F.R. § 124.603(b)(2) (1979).
279. Id. §§ 124.603(a)(1) & (b)(1). In Aguinaga v. Castro County Hosp. Dist., Civ. No.
CA 2-79-205 (N.D. Tex.) (settled Jan. 13, 1984) (as reported in ADVOCATES GuiDE, supra
note 277, at 44, 82 n.61), an eleven-month-old baby died after the hospital refused admission for lack of a $450 advance deposit. Id. In the settlement, the hospital agreed to (1)
provide emergency services regardless of ability to pay; (2) condition hospital privileges on a
certain amount of emergency care and supervision; (3) transfer patients only if tho other
hospital agreed to provide the care; and (4) pay for the care of a transfered patient. Id.
Aguinaga is one of the rare cases when the injured was able to exhaust all administrative
remedies and file suit against the hospital.
280. 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972).
281. Id. at 360.
282. Lugo v. Simon, 426 F. Supp. 28, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 291c (1982)
(uncompensated care obligation of twenty years). Prior community service regulations imposed a time limit, but Lugo invalidated them. 426 F. Supp. at 36. See also Wing, supra
note 275.
283. 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984).
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to pay.2s4

Court victories have been few and far between.28 1!1 Attempts to
bring court action are delayed by the requirement that a complainant must first exhaust all administrative remedies.286 Nor does the
statute expressly provide for a private right of action. In cases involving an implied private right of action, the statute's vague language has sometimes made it difficult for the court to provide
meaningful remedies. 287 As recently as 1985, the Sixth Circuit288
held that plaintiffs had no cause of action to force investigation or
effect compliance by the regulated facilities. The Hill-Burton Act
continues to be plagued with little or no enforcement.289 Legal advocates on behalf of the poor have been frustrated. Clearly, the
Hill-Burton Act has not proved to be an effective enforcement tool
for establishing a duty to provide emergency care.290
284. 721 F.2d at 178.
285. See, e.g., Lane v. Lincoln County Hosp., 537 F. Supp. 114, 120 (E.D. Tenn. 1982)
(current regulations not applicable to hospital, receiving Title VI assistance, that did not
provide adequate assurances). See also Newsom v. Vanderbilt Univ., 653 F.2d 1100, 1107-10
(6th Cir. 1981) (failure to comply not proven).
286. 42 C.F.R. § 124.606(a)(4)(1987). Administrative complaints require dismiSSIIl
before civil action is proper. I d. The complainant, however, is not notified of their satisfaction of the exhaustion requirements or that a suit is maintainable. ADVOCATE'S GUIDE, supra
note 277, at 96. See also Barlow v. Marion County Hosp. Dist., 495 F. Supp. 682, 690-93
(M.D. Fla. 1980) (exhaustion requirement not effected by alleging civil rights clnims).
287. See Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform & Administrative Law: A Structural Approach, 88 YAI:E L.J. 243, 273-76 (1978) (citing Perry v. Greater S.E. Community Hosp.
Found., No. 725-71 (D.D.C. June 28, 1972) (no relieO); Cook v. Ochsner Found. Hosp., 319
F. Supp. 603, 606 (E.D. La. 1970) (granting relieO. See also Note, Preventing Patient
Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1200 (1986) [hereinafter
Note, Preventing Patient Dumping].
288. Gillis v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 578 (6th
Cir. 1985).
289. HHS has not provided facilities with formal technical assistance nor clear policies
and procedures for implementing community service assurances. Its Office for Civil Rights
has also been lax in review of violations. Dowell, supra note 272, at 487-88.
290. Another potential enforcement tool is the tax law. Under both state and federol
law, nonprofit hospitals are eligible for tax exemption. Legal advocates have been successful
in a few instances in having the tax exempt status revoked for the hospital's failure to provide necessary hospital services to those unable to pay as a denial of a charitable purpose.
Of course, such action does not provide the poor with a private cause of action, but the
threat of change in tax status may work as an effective enforcement tool. See Dowell, supra
note 272, at 489-90. See also Lugo v. Miller, 640 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981) Oow income individuals brought class action challenging revenue ruling which states that hospitals are not
compelled to provide free non-emergency care to maintain tax exempt status.) At least one
attempt has been made to use the violation of Medicare regulations regarding emergency
care conditions of participation to prove negligence in a private cause of action. See Distad
v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo. 1981).
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THE CoBRA STATUTE: THE FEDERAL SoLUTION?

The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, effective August 1, 1986, added a new section to the
Medicare provisions, entitled "Examination and Treatment for
Emergency Medical Conditions and Women in Labor." 291
The Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives introduced the new provision because it was greatly concerned about the increasing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms were refusing to accept or treat patients with
emergency conditions if the patient did not have medical insurance. 292 The main concern of the Committee was that medically
unstable patients were being treated inappropriately. There continued to be reports of cases in which treatment was simply not
provided and of patients in an unstable condition who had been
transferred improperly, sometimes without the consent of the receiving hospital. 293

A. The Provisions
COBRA applies to hospitals that participate in the Medicare
program. This includes virtually all hospitals. However, hospitals
without an emergency service, any facility that is not a hospital,
free-standing emergency facilities that are not owned or formally
affiliated with a hospital, and ambulatory care facilities and their
staff physicians are all exempt from the federal law. 294 The law
protects all persons who come to an emergency room, whether or
not such persons are eligible for Medicare benefits. 29 G All persons
who show up at the emergency door must be treated alike, whether
291. The new statute is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986). The emergency care pro·
visions generally are referred to as "COBRA." Proposed rules were not issued until June
1988. 53 Fed. Reg. 22,513 (proposed June 16, 1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 489,
1001, 1003). Refer to note 4 supra and accompanying text.
292. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 21 (1985). Refusal to treat indi·
gent patients has increased because fewer patients have adequate health insurance and most
insurers, including Medicare and Medicaid, will not pay hospitals for the extra cost of cross·
subsidizing cases of those unable to pay. With new competitive pressures to cut costs, there
is even less economic incentive to subsidize emergency care than there was a decade ago.
The growth of investor-owned for-profit hospitals, which generally discourage treatment of
the nonpaying patient, has further exacerbated the problem. See Equal Access, supra note
2, at 98-99, 105 (statement of Dr. Reiman).
293. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 21 (1985).
294. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1986).
295. Id.
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or not they are insured. This duty is not conditioned on any guarantee of government reimbursement.
The federal statute requires that the hospital examine each
person who requests medical treatment to determine if an emergency situation exists or if the individual is in active labor.:l9a If
such person is in active labor or in need of emergency care, then
the hospital must: (1) provide treatment to stabilize the emergency
condition; (2) provide treatment for labor; or (3) provide for an
"appropriate transfer" of the patient to another medical facility.:m
An "appropriate transfer" is carefully defined under the statute. If the patient has not been stabilized, or is in active labor, the
hospital may not transfer unless: (1) the patient or legally responsible person acting on behalf of the patient requests a transfer;298
or (2) a physician, or other qualified person when a physician is
not readily available, signs a certification to the effect that the
"medical benefits reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment at another medical facility outweigh the
increased risks to the individual's medical condition from effecting
the transfer."299 A patient may be transferred only if: (1) the receiving hospital or facility has available space, qualified personnel
for treatment of the patient, has agreed to the transfer and has
been provided with the appropriate medical records from the
transferring hospital;300 and (2) the transfer is made using proper
296. I d. The statute defines an "emergency medical condition" as "a medical condition
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that
the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in (a) placing the patient's health in serious jeopardy,
(b) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(c) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part."
Id. § 1395dd(e)(l).
"Active labor" is defined as "labor at a time at which (a) delivery is imminent,
(b) there is inadequate time to effect safe transfer to another hospital prior to
delivery or,
(c) a transfer may pose a threat to the health and safety of the patient or the
unborn child."
Id. § 1395dd(e)(2).
297. Id. § 1395dd(b). The statute also provides that the hospital has met its duty if
medical treatment is refused by the patient, or if the patient refuses an "appropriate" transfer. Id.
298. Id. § 1395dd(c)(l).
299. Id. For example; the patient is badly burned and the transfer hospital has a special burn trauma unit.
300. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (1986).
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personnel and equipment; 301 and (3) the transfer meets any other
requirements which the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare may deem necessary. 302
Violations of the statute subject a hospital to suspension or
termination of its Medicare provider agreement. 303 In addition,
both the hospital and the "responsible physician"304 may be
charged a fifty-thousand-dollar civil penalty for each knowing violation of the statute. 3011 The penalty provisions were a matter of
controversy. The original bill provided for the imposition of criminal penalties on a "responsible physician," allowing fines of up to
100,000 dollars and imprisonment for up to one year, or both. 300
This provision was harshly criticized,307 and the House Committee
301. Id. This includes the use of necessary and appropriate life support measures.
302. Id.
303. Id. § 1395dd(d)(l).
304. A "responsible physician" is defined as one who is employed by or under contract
with the hospital and, within the scope of his/her employment or duties under the contract
"has professional responsibility for the provision of examinations or treatments for the individual, or transfers of the individual, with respect to which the violation occurred." Id. §
1395dd(d)(2). The proposed rule further expands on this definition. 53 Fed. Reg. 22,513,
22,525 (proposed June 16, 1988).
305. !d. This amount was raised from $25,000 to $50,000 for violations occurring on or
after December 22, 1987 pursuant to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-203, § 4009(a)(1), 101 Stat. 1330, 1330-57 (1987). Further technical amendments
were made in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, §
411(b)(8), 102 Stat. 683, 771 (1988).
306. H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 14 (1985).
307. Paul M. Bunge, representing the Miami, Florida law firm of Kenny, Nachwalter
& Seymour, wrote to the Judiciary Committee and charged that criminal sanctions were too
harsh:
The availability of insurance coverage for violations of [the proposed bill] is questionable. Most policies specifically exclude coverage for damages incurred as a re·
suit of criminal acts, and insurance in such circumstances may otherwise be pro·
hibited as a matter of public policy. . . . The Committee should also bear in mind
that most States require the revocation of a medical license upon conviction of a
felony related to the practice of medicine •... Thus the violation, purposeful or
inadvertent, of [the bill] by a physician will almost always result in that physi·
cian's removal from the profession. . . . I fear that [the proposed bill] is over·
broad in its application, vague in its requirements and unnecessarily severe in its
sanctions.
Id. at 19-20.
The American College of Emergency Physicians also wrote to the Judiciary Committee:
Although we are in agreement with the objective of the legislation (i.e., to
eliminate inappropriate patient transfers), we believe the statutory language is excessively punitive to emergency physicians without truly addressing the patient
transfer problem. The language as approved by the Ways and Means Committee
is so intimidating to emergency physicians that transfers which are in the best
interest of patient care may be avoided or delayed. Because of the uncertain na·
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on the Judiciary deleted it because it was "unnecessary, unwise,
and raise[d) serious Constitutional questions under the due process
clause/'308
The "civil enforcement" provision provides that any individual who suffers personal harm due to a hospital's violation of the
statute may institute a civil action to obtain damages and equitable relief. 309 Any medical facility that suffers a direct financial loss
due to a violation of the statute may also institute a private cause
of action against the participating hospital for damages and equitable relief.310 There is a two-year statute of limitation for these
actions.311
Such comprehensive enforcement provisions are unprecedented in a Medicare statute, yet the bill passed with little notice
by the general public. No hearings on the proposed bill were held
in the House or the Senate,312 and two letters received by the
House Judiciary Committee on the penalty provision appear to be
the only public reaction received.313

B . . Prospects and Problems
COBRA answers many of the concerns of plaintiffs who have
been trying to find a duty on the part of hospitals to provide emergency medical treatment since O'Neill v. Montefiore Hospital. 314
ture of the practice of emergency medicine and because of the retrospective stan·
dards of liability of this provision, emergency physicians may avoid transfers in
order to protect themselves against criminal penalties and ultimate loss of their
medical licenses because of the potential of felony convictions. Extreme caution
could also result in prolonged detentions and unnecessary admissions. Neither is
in the interest of patient care and both would increase health care costs.
Id. at 21-22.
308. ld. at 7.
309. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(A) (1986). The section specifically allows "damages
available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located." I d.
For a discussion of this provision, refer to notes 343-70 infra and accompanying text. It is
the position of one hospital attorney that the statute "is a litigation time bomb waiting to
explode." Dooley, New Federal Law Helps Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs, 6 LAw. ALERT
330 (1987).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(B) (1986).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3)(C) {1986). The federal statute also specifically states
that its provisions do not preempt any state or local law requirement, except to the extent
that there is a direct conflict between them and the requirements of the federal law. Id. §
1395dd(f). Refer to notes 347-55 infra and accompanying text.
312. H.R REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 6 (1985).
313. Refer to note 307 supra.
314. 11 A.D.2d 132, 202 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1960). Refer to notes 54-60 supra and accompa-
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Of course, the greatest achievement of the COBRA statute is the
creation of a statutory duty to offer at least stabilizing treatment
in an emergency. The requirement of a medical screening examination establishes the relationship between the hospital and the patient; therefore, there is no longer a need for courts to creatively
interpret the facts of a case to find this relationship. 31 G Also, there
is no further need for courts to find theories on which to base liability such as those evidenced in Manlove 316 and Guerrero. 311 The
statute provides that one need only prove a violation of the statute
to establish a breach of the duty to examine or treat each individual who comes to the emergency department. 318
The statute also addresses the concerns of the plaintiffs in Hill
v. Ohio County 319 and Campbell v. Mincey 320 by placing "active
labor" in the same status as an emergency condition and thereby
requiring treatment. 321 Furthermore, the plaintiff in Campbell
should at least have been able to collect nominal damages. In fact,
it appears that anyone who suffers "personal harm" as a result of a
hospital's violation of the statute may collect damages. 322 Therefore, relatives such as the mother of the child who died in
Quijije323 might be able to recover for emotional distress.
COBRA does not, however, answer all of the problems that
typically face plaintiffs. Some problems may be rectified by final
regulations, but others may require amendments. 324 First, it will be
nying text.
315. Id.
316. 54 Del. 15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961). Refer to notes 62-105 supra and accompanying
text.
317. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 (1975). Refer to notes 214-28 supra and accompany·
ing text.
318. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
319. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972). Refer to notes 130·
39 supra and accompanying text.
320. 413 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1973). Refer to
notes 233-45 supra and accompanying text.
321. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
322. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd (d)(3)(A) (1986).
323. 92 A.D.2d 935, 460 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1983). Refer to notes 267-70 supra and accom·
panying text.
324. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this Section to discuss all of the limitations
of the federal statute given its focus on inappropriate transfer of patients. Therefore, tho
analysis in this Section will emphasize the ways in which the statute does or does not doni
with the problem of refusal to render emergency care, focusing particularly on the private
cause of action as an effective enforcement tool. For an excellent analysis of the statute ns to
its effect on interhospital transfers, see Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, nt
1204-09.
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difficult to prove a violation. Vague definitions control whether a
person comes within the protection of the statute. For example, an
"appropriate medical screening exam" is not defined, nor is there
any indication as to who may or must conduct this exam.3211 The
definitions of "emergency" and "active labor"326 are also not specific enough to clearly indicate when the statute applies.327 Therefore, courts may still be left with much latitude to decide what is
or is not an "emergency" or "active" labor. Perhaps Hill v. Ohio
County328 would not have been decided so very differently under
COBRA.329 The American College of Emergency Physicians
(ACEP) has suggested the use of a more extensive definition of
"emergency medical condition."330 A more detailed definition of
"active labor" exists in the Hill-Burton policy manual and it
should be used as a model from which to draft COBRA regulations.331 As noted above, these definitions are the key to whether
patients come within the protection of the statute, and should be
as detailed and easy to interpret as possible.
325. Nurses generally conduct this exam or "triage," and the regulations should make
clear whether this practice may continue. There is no description of what elements this
examination must include. See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1216; See
also Kellermann & Hackman, Emergency Department Patient "Dumping" in Memphis,
Tennessee: An Analysis of Interhospital Transfers to the Regional Medical Center at
Memphis, reprinted in Equal Access, supra note 2, at 122, 125 (recommending that "appropriate screening exam" be defined and judged against a national standard of care).
326. Refer to note 296 supra. .
327. See Equal Access, supra note 2, at 154 (statement of David Ansell,l\LD., Attending Physician, Division of General Medicine/Prinlary Care, Cook County Hospital, Chicago,
lllinois); Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1209, 1212.
328. 468 S.W.2d 306 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1041 (1972).
329. Refer to notes 130-39 supra and accompanying text.
330. For the ACEP definition of an "emergency," see ACEP Board Reviews Dejini·
tions of Bona Fide Emergencies, ACEP NEWS, Dec. 1982, at 1, coL 1. See also Preuenting
Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1210-11 (recommending HHS adoption of previous,
broader ACEP definition); Ansell & Schiff, Patient Dumping: Status, Implications, and
Policy Recommendations, 257 J. A.M.A. 1500, 1502, reprinted in Equal Access, supra note
2, at 175, 177 (recommending use of ACEP definitions of "emergency").
331. The definition of "active labor" used by the Health and Human Services Office
for Civil Rights is:
A woman giving birth for the first tinle should be admitted when her contractions are regular, progressively hard and closer and occurring at about five minute
intervals. A woman who has given birth before should be admitted as soon as her
contractions are regular and the diagnosis of labor seems likely. The overnll principle guiding these rules is that admission to the hospital should, if possible, be
delayed until labor is established but not so long that there is a risk of delivery
outside the hospital.
Advocate's Guide, supra note 277, at 41 (quoting OCR Community Service Guide, at Tab
B). See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1212.
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The statute also suffers from problems of scope. In other
words, there are a number of ways in which hospitals and physicians can evade the purposes of the statute, without actually violating it. For example, the law does not explicitly provide for a
penalty for on-call physicians who refuse to respond in an emergency. Smaller hospitals may not have an emergency physician on
the premises at all times, and many hospitals use the services of
on-call specialists in the emergency room. 332 The statute and the
proposed regulations define "responsible physician"333 in a manner
that may be broad enough to include the on-call physician. However, the final regulations or an amendment to the statute should
clarify this point. The on-call physician's refusal to treat is a growing problem. 334
Another potential loophole in the statute involves "pre-dumping," that is, advance agreements with ambulance services directing indigent persons to public hospitals and away from private
hospitals. 335 This problem is not covered in the statute as it now
reads, yet could become a widely used method by which to avoid
its goals. Therefore, the federal statute should be amended to prohibit such agreements.
A third problem of scope is known as "reverse dumping," in
which the transferee hospital refuses to accept the patient because
332. See Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713, 715-16 (La. 1986) (the
thoracic surgeon on-call inquired as to whether the victim of a stabbing had insurance and,
upon receiving a negative reply, refused to come to the hospital and ordered that the patient
be transferred).
A similar incident took place in a rural Idaho hospital which used an on-call emergency
physician. A child, suffering from severe stomach pains and a high fever, was brought into
the emergency room by her parents. The doctor, after determining that the family had no
insurance, stated that he could not come in for several hours. The child was eventually
treated and recovered, but was subjected to hours of pain, distress, and anxiety. Equal Ac·
cess, supra note 2, at 45 (statement of Judith Waxman, Attorney, National Health Law
Program).
333. Refer to note 304 supra.
334. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 39, 52 (statement of Judith Waxman, Attorney,
National Health Law Program); id. at 261-62 (statement of Lois Salisbury, attorney repre·
senting Coalition to Stop Patient Dumping). Hospitals may also address the problem by
tying on-call duties to hospital staff privileges. A hospital's failure to do so might result in
loss of licensure. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 1317.3(c) (West Supp. 1988).
335. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 241 (statement of Richard P. Kusserow, Inspector
General, Office for Civil Rights); id. at 260 (statement of Salisbury). See also Wideman v.
Shallowford Community Hosp., No. 86-8512 (11th Cir., Sept. 8, 1987) (woman in labor repeatedly asked to be taken to a specific hospital, but was taken, in accordance with the
ambulance service's agreement with the county, to a public hospital) (discussed in 11th Cir·
cuit Finds No Constitutional Right to Medical Treatment, 10 HEALTH L. VIGIL 1 (1987)).
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the patient has no insurance or because of some other, nonmedical
reason. For example, a large, rural, tertiary hospital in McAllen,
Texas, implemented a policy in which it would not accept transfers
of Medicaid patients or patients without insurance. As a result, a
smaller hospital in the area was denied permission to transfer a
teenager with a gunshot wound who was in need of tertiary care.
Thus, it advised the boy's parents to simply "show up" at the
emergency room of the tertiary hospital where it would have to
treat him. The hospital did not violate the "letter" of the law, but
it certainly violated its "spirit. " 336 COBRA should be amended to
include within its scope a prohibition against "reverse
dumping."337
Perhaps the greatest problems with the COBRA statute lie in
its enforcement provisions. Although federal officials claim that the
law can be implemented without regulations,338 the facts do not
bear this out. As noted earlier, proposed rules were not issued until
June 1988.339 As of September 30, 1988, only 224 investigations
had been filed with HHS.340 At a Congressional hearing held on
July 22, 1987, physicians testified that the statute had "no perceptible impact" on their hospitals.341 One reason for the ineffectiveness of the COBRA statute may be a lack of public information. In
fact, most filed complaints originated in Texas and California, the
states with strict emergency care statutes and much media attention to persistent refusals by hospitals to treat emergency
patients.342
336. The boy died a few days later. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 44-45 (statement of
Judith Waxman, Attorney, National Health Law Program).
337. See Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1221; see also H.R. REP. No.
531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988).
338. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 202 (statement of William Roper, M.D., Administrator, HCFA).
339. Refer to note 291 supra and accompanying text.
340. Of the 224 investigations authorized, 212 have been completed and 12 are pending. Of those hospitals investigated, 146 were found in compliance, 61 out of compliance and
5 are still under review. Two hospitals have had their provider agreements terminated: York
Plaza Hospital, Houston, Texas and Mary E. Dickerson Hospital, Jasper, Texas. Telephone
discussion on Nov. 2, 1988 with Spencer Colburn, Chief, Acute Care Services Branch, Office
of Survey & Certification, Health Standards & Quality Bureau, Health Care Financing Admin., HHS, Baltimore, Md.
341. Id. at 13-14; Equal Access, supra note 2, at 181-82 (statements of Drs. Ansell &
Kellermann).
342. H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1988); Equal Access, supra note 2, at
app. at 434-39. To achieve compliance nationally, a greater effort must be made to inform
the public as to the new law's existence. This can be done, in part, through the media and
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Potentially, the most powerful enforcement tool is the threat
of civil enforcement. This enforcement provision provides, in part,
that
any individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a
participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section
may, in a civil action against the participating hospital, obtain
those damages available for personal injury under the law of the
State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as
is appropriate. 3' 3
should include the posting of notices in emergency rooms. Making pamphlets or some other
form of written notice available to emergency room patients would increase knowledge of
the statute and would be a major first step in the direction of enforcement. See Equal Ac·
cess, supra note 2, at 52 (statement of Judith Waxman, Attorney, National Health Law
Program). H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 21 (1988); Preventing Patient Dump•
ing, supra note 287, at 1220.
The next step would be regulations which clarify the proper procedure to file com·
plaints. Included in these regulations would be procedures by which the proper HHS agency
would respond to the complainants. Numerous problems exist in ensuring that those who
file complaints receive notice of receipt of the complaint and notice of the final outcome of
the investigation. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 229 (statement of Rep. Ted Weiss, New
York).
Several other enforcement issues should be addressed by the final regulations or by
amendment. First, when is an investigation warranted, and what guidelines should be used
in the investigation? Equal Access, supra note 2, at 239-40. Second, a method of monitoring
should be instituted, involving written records of all transfers or discharges of emergency
room patients, and review of such records by JCAHO or by an agency of HHS should be
done on a regular basis. See Equal Access, supra note 2, at 65 (statement of Judith Waxman); id. at 159 (statement of Dr. Ansell). See also H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
15, 19 (1988)(recommendation of Dr. Arthur L. Kellerman, medical director of emergency
medical services, The Regional Medical Center, Memphis, Tenn., that hospitals receiving
transferred patients file reports of all dumping cases which could be periodically audited by
an agency such as JCAHO); Preventing Patient Dumping, supra note 287, at 1219 (recommending prompt investigation by HHS personnel). Third, because of reluctance of hospitals,
who are often in the same community or hospital association, to report violations the law
should require hospitals to report incidents of patient dumping. Equal Access, supra note 2,
at 39, 53 (statement of Judith Waxman). The proposed regulations do provide this provision. 53 Fed. Reg. at 22,523 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 489.24) (proposed June
16, 1988).
343. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(d)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). The House originally provided
broader language: "Any person who suffers personal harm ... may bring a civil action, in
an appropriate Federal district court against the participating hospital, for damages and
other appropriate relief." See CoNFERENCE CoMMI'ITEE REPORT ON THE CoNSOLIDATED OMNI·
BUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1985 (H.R. 3128), reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) Special 4, No. 481, at 476. (Jan. 13, 1986).
The Senate bill made no provision for a private right of action. The conference agreement modified the House language with the following explanation:
The civil enforcement provision was restructured to clarify its application. In
addition, the courts are directed, on the issue of damages, to apply the law of the
State in which the violating hospital is located, for actions brought by a harmed
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If this provision is to have an impact, it must be clarified and

strengthened.34' To date, only a handful of cases have been filed by
individuals harmed by a hospital's violation of the statute.3411
The first problem plaintiffs face is one of causation, proving
that harm was directly caused by a hospital's violation. Most people who enter an emergency room are by definition sick or injured.
If their conditions deteriorate or they die it may not be possible to
prove that harm was the direct result of the denial of care or patient transfer.346
Another problem with this provision is the language that provides the individual with damages available for personal injury
under state law. Does this provision bring us full circle, back to the
old common law? Is this language meant to limit the amount of
damages based on each state's personal injury law or exclude damages altogether under certain circumstances? For example, would
plaintiffs in some states be prevented from receiving punitive damages for a hospital's violation?
The COBRA statute does provide that it will not "preempt
.any state or local law requirement, except to the extent that the
requirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section."3'7 At a minimum, this provision appears to address requirements pursuant to state or local emergency care statutes.348 Under
individual or a hospital which suffers a financial loss. The language allowing courts
to grant 'other appropriate relier was also modified to read 'other equitable relief
as appropriate,' to give the courts clearer direction that such relief should be
within the courts [sic] regular equitable powers and should be granted for the
purpose of remedying the violation or deterring subsequent violntions.

I d.
344. H.R REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-19 {1988).
345. The National Law Journal, June 6, 1988 at 1, col 1, 29, col 4. It hns been reported that only one civil damage law suit has been filed in Chicago and six cases are on file
in Boston alleging COBRA violations. One expert predicts the "full impact of the law will
not be felt until several cases go through the appeal process." Id. at 30, col 4.
346. Consider for example, the case of Terry Takewell, who was diabetic and very ill
when he was denied treatment in the emergency room. Refer to note 2 supra and accompa·
nying text. Since necessary tests were never done, it might be extremely difficult to prove
that the hospital's violation directly caused his death. Furthermore, because he died, his
direct testimony of what happened will not be available. See Equal Access, supra note 2, at
298, 300 (letter from Gordon Bonnyman, Staff Attorney, Legal Services of Middle
Tennessee).
347. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(O (Supp. IV 1986) {emphasis supplied).
348. State or local laws that set looser standards and directly conllict v.ith COBRA
should be preempted. Based on the intent of Congress it would be fair to argue that stricter
state standards should be maintained, unless there is clearly strong evidence of a direct
conflict with federal law. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,

HeinOnline -- 26 Hous. L. Rev. 69 1989

70

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:21

the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,3 " 9 however, federal preemption will also be implied if a state law frustrates the intent and
purpose of the federal statute. 3110 Although health and safety matters are traditionally local concerns, Congress expressed its intent
to seek a national solution to assuring access to emergency care. aGt
On the other hand, the civil enforcement provision specifically relies on state law for obtaining damages and equitable relief.
How then does the federal right of action apply to state law?
Would charitable immunity, sovereign immunity, or "good samaritan" immunity laws apply? 3112 Would "caps"3113 on damages and
other tort reforms limit the amounts available under the statute or
be preempted in favor of a uniform federal law for these cases? 304
Without a legislative history, one can only speculate whether Congress would have intended to do away with "caps" and other tort
reform measures implemented by the states to achieve goals such
as lowering medical malpractice insurance rates or encouraging
physicians to continue practicing their profession. The answer may
depend on whether such reforms apply equally to all plaintiffs for
personal injury.
The COBRA statute should preempt certain immunities. If
this were not so, then states could enact statutes which revive certain immunities and avoid the new statute's requirements altogether. In fact, this is a very real threat in light of recent state
legislation which attempts to apply good samaritan laws to hospital emergency rooms. 31111
471 U.S. 707 (1985)(holding county regulations governing blood plasma centers not pre·
empted by Food and Drug Administration regulations establishing minimum standards).
349. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
350. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824); Hines v. Davida·
witz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
351. Refer to note 348 supra.
352. One hospital attorney argues that COBRA appears to preempt all state law. See
Dooley, New Federal Law Helps Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs, 6 LAw. ALERT 330, 332
(June 15, 1987).
353. If caps are just limited to "medical malpractice" awards, one might argue that
this does not apply to awards for "personal injury," the term used in the COBRA provision.
If the cap covers all personal injury, however, it might limit the award under this COBRA
provision. Discussion with Stephen Frew and Robert Dooley,legal consultants on emergency
care (July 15, 1988).
354. Refer to note 352 supra.
355. All states and the District of Columbia have adopted good samaritan laws. Such
laws protect health care professionals and others who render emergency assistance from civil
liability for damages for any injury they cause or enhance. These statutes range from mere
codifications of the common law to grants of absolute immunity. The first statute was
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Few cases have interpreted the use of good samaritan laws.
The first attempt to utilize such protection in a refusal to treat
case was Guerrero. 3156 Since then, these laws have been utilized as
defenses when negligent treatment was rendered in the hospital.3157
As early as the 1960s, commentators were shocked at the prospect that these immunity statutes might be applied to emergency
rooms. 3158 Yet other commentators have urged more uniform inclupassed in 1959 in California. See generally Note, Good Samaritans and Hospital Emergencies, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 417 {1981) [hereinafter Good Samaritans).
The intent of good samaritan laws is to encourage physicians and others to respond to
emergencies {typically at the scene of an accident) when they have no legal duty to do so.
The hope is that emergency care would then be provided to those who would otherwise not
receive it. Since there would be no threat of suit, health care professionals would be more
willing to provide assistance. Throughout the 1960s this legislation spread, in spite of a 1963
American Medical Association study which found that the laws ronde no significant difference in a physician's behavior. First Results: 1963 Professional Liability Survey, 189 J.
A.M.A. 859, 865 {1964). In the study, 51.5% of the physicians in states which had enacted
good samaritan law said they would stop to furnish aid, and 47.7% of physicians in states
that did not have good samaritan statutes said they would do so. Id.
Nevertheless, by the time of the malpractice insurance "crisis" of 1974, state legislatures
were anxious to respond, and expansion of the good samaritan statutes wns a popular solution. B. FURROW, S. JoHNSON, L JoST & R ScHWARTZ, HEALTH LAw: CASES MATERJALS AND
PROBLEMS 134-35 n.2 {West 1987). At that time no cases had been found in which a physician had been sued for malpractice for rendering emergency care outside of a medical office
or hospital See 2 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, l\1EDICAL MALPRACTICE 11 21.01, at 21-3, 21-4 {1988).
Rather, most reported cases involved attempts by physicians to invoke good samaritan protection for negligence within the hospitaL I d. at 21-4. This occurred although the majority
of state statutes continued to exclude medical services rendered in the hospital from good
samaritan immunity. Most jurisdictions require that the care be given nt the scene of the
emergency, which may be defined to specifically exclude the hospital or the presence of
medical equipment. Although less clear, the language of other statutes implies that the hospital setting is excluded. See Good Samaritans, supra note 355, at 428; See also Note, Good
Samaritan Statutes: Time for Uniformity, 27 WAYNE L. REv. 217, 228 {1980). A few jurisdictions, such as Alaska, Kansas, Texas, and Michigan do expressly include emergencies
within a hospital ALAsKA STAT. § 09.65.90 {1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-289{c) {1985 &
Supp. 1987); TEx. CIV. PRAc. & Rl!:l'ot Con& ANN.§ 17.001 {Vernon 1986); 1\ficiL CoMP. LAws
ANN.§ 691.1502 {West 1987). Texas, however, does not provide immunity to a person who
"regularly administers care in the emergency room, • • • an admitting physician, • • . or a
treating physician associated by the admitting physician." TEx. C1v. PRAc. & REM. Con& §
17.001 {Vernon 1986).
356. 112 Ariz. 104, 537 P.2d 1329 {1975). Refer to text accompanying note 228 supra.
357. See, e.g., Colby v. Schwartz, 78 Cal. App. 3d 885, 888, 144 Cal Rptr. 624, 625
{1978) {physicians acting in normal course of practice not immune); McKenna v. Cedars of
Lebanon Hosp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 282, 286, 155 Cal. Rptr. 631, 633 {1979) (resident not "on
call" for emergencies protected by statute); Gragg v. Neurological Assocs., 152 Ga. App. SSS,
263 S.E.2d 496,497-98 {1979) {crisis during hospital procedure not emergency within protection of statute).
358. See, e.g., Comment, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64
CoLUr.t L. REv. 1301, 1310 {1964); Note, Good Samaritan Legislation: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 38 TEMP. L.Q. 418, 425 {1965); Good Samaritans, supra note 355, at 430.
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sion of the hospital emergency room and its personnel within the
protection of such statutes. 359 This protective approach is seen as a
means of assuring that emergency care is provided without the fear
of liability. This position has political appeal, particularly as state
legislatures attempt to respond to the most recent boycotts of
emergency rooms by physicians protesting rising malpractice rates.
Now that both hospitals and physicians have affirmative duties under COBRA to provide treatment to those in need of emergency care, will such good samaritan statutes frustrate the intent
and purpose of the federal statute? In theory, good samaritan statutes should not apply where an affirmative duty has already been
established. In practice, there will be confusion over the federal
statute and how it applies to these recent expansions in immunity.
Two recent state legislative initiatives are illustrative.
During the 1987 legislative session, Virginia was faced with a
"crisis." Obstetricians were threatening to reduce their "on call"
services to emergency rooms, particularly for poor women in active
labor. Responding to increases in malpractice insurance rates, the
physicians argued that emergency room practice increased their
exposure to suit. Pregnant women, either on Medicaid or without
any health insurance, would show up at the emergency door in active labor, without a regular physician and with no medical
records. The physicians characterized their role in treating these
women as "good samaritans." Although physicians would not be
required under state law to treat, the new law provides that, in the
absence of gross negligence, "any person" would be granted immunity from civil damages for acts or omissions resulting from the
rendering of emergency obstetrical care. 360 Under COBRA, would
participating hospitals still be liable, even though the responsible
physician was immune from suit?
359. See, e.g., Tuttle, Hospital Emergency Rooms-Application of Good Samaritan
Laws, 31 MEn. TRIAL TEcH. Q. 145 (1984).
360. Senate Bill 408 passed March 23, 1987, amending § 8.01-225 of the Code of
Virginia:
Any person who, in the absence of gross negligence, renders emergency obstetrical care or assistance to a female in active labor who has not previously been
cared for in connection with the pregnancy by such person or by another professionally associated with such person and whose medical records are not reasonably
available to such person shall not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such emergency care or assistance. Tho immunity herein granted shall apply only to the emergency medical care provided.
Discussion and background materials (unpublished) provided by Josephine Foehrenbach,
Harvard Fellow, Va. Poverty Law Center, Inc., Richmond, Va. (1987).
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In Georgia, similar efforts were successful to immunize health
care providers and hospitals, among others, from liability for dam-

ages for injury or death resulting from an act or omission in rendering professional services when the services provided "voluntarily and without the expectation or receipt of compensation"}101
Once again, the legislation was framed as a "good samaritan" bill
to encourage the provision of services without threat of suit.302
Although these statutes may make political sense, they should
be discouraged in the context of providing emergency room care.
Physicians and hospitals have an affirmative duty under COBRA
to examine and treat all emergency patients and those women in
active labor regardless of ability to pay. The law was passed to assure access without undermining the standards applicable to their
care. To allow this immunity will result in a continued two-tiered
system for emergency care. Clearly, this result is contrary to the
legislative purpose of the new federal statute, which was to promote access and quality of service regardless of income. There is
no credible evidence that such immunity will in fact reduce insurance rates or increase access to care. Any attempt through the use
of an immunity statute to compromise such a goal should be pre361. Emphasis added. § 51-1-29.1 of Georgia Code provides:
(a) [U]nless it is established that injuries or death were caused by gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct:
(1) No health care provider.•• who voluntarily and without the expectation
or receipt of compensation provides professional services, within the scope of such
health care provider's licensure, for and at the request of a hospital, public school,
nonprofit organization, or an agency of the state or one of its political subdivisions
or provides such professional services to a person at the request of such organization, which organization does not expect or receive compensation with respect to
such services from the recipient of such services; or
(2) No licensed hospital, public school, or nonprofit organization, which requests, sponsors, or participates in the providing of the services under the circumstances provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be liable for d!lDl!lges or
injuries alleged to have been sustained by the person nor for d!lDl!lges for the injury or death of the person when the injuries or death are alleged to have occurred
by reason of an act or omission in the rendering of such services.
(b) This Code section shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after
July 1, 1987.
GA. ConE ANN. § 51-1-29.1 (Supp. 1988). A number of more general immunity statutes have
passed nationwide to immunize "volunteers" who provide medical services, regardless of the
setting of such services. See, e.g., NATIONAL CoNFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1987 SuMMARY LIABILITY INSURANCE: :MAY 31, 1987, (1987).
362. Discussion with Linda Lowe, Staff Member, Georgia Legal Services Program, Atlanta, Ga. (Spring 1987).
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empted by federal statute. 363 If not, the statute must be specifically
amended to prohibit immunity under state law for violations of the
COBRA statute.
In fact, research shows no correlation between low income and
a proclivity to file suits against physicians and hospitals. 364 The
poor do not tend to file suits. Personal injury cases are expensive
and lawyers are reluctant to take such cases on a contingency basis
from poor people without an assurance of substantial dollar
worth. 365 Ironically, the failure of the poor to sue may limit the
ultimate impact of civil enforcement.
Of course, the "preventive effect of the statute is diluted if
only those cases which command a large damage award are
brought."366 It has been proposed that the award of attorney's fees
would correct this problem. 387 Similar fee-shifting provisions already exist in antitrust, consumer protection, and tax appeal statutes. These statutes recognize the importance of attracting competent counsel and the belief that it is only fair for the wrongdoer to
pay the cost of vindicating federal rights. 368
Another approach suggested to strengthen civil enforcement is
to provide for liquidated damages to be paid to the individual
363. Refer to notes 348-54 supra and accompanying text.
364. See, e.g., DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 75 (1985). Danzon states that the percentage of the population on welfare, the unemployment rate and the per capita income had
no significant effect on claim frequency or severity of claims filed. I d. See also Rudov, Myers
& Mirabella, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims Files Closed in 1970 (Appendix), in
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, (DHEW No. (OS) 73.89,
1, 11-12 (1973).
365. See Rosenblatt, Rationing "Normal" Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59
TExAs L. REv. 1401, 1415-16 (1981) for an excellent summary of why traditional malpractice
law does not serve the interests of protecting the poor. Rosenblatt notes that the poor have
low expectations regarding treatment and results; little incentive to seek recovery because
they must return part of the award to the welfare department; and difficulty obtaining nc·
cess to legal services. Nor can legal service attorneys accept such "fee-generating" cases
from poor clients. Id. at 1415 n.87, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
366. H.R. REP. No. 100-531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988).
367. Id. See also Equal Access, supra note 2, at 55, 262-63, 302. The following Inn·
guage was suggested: "In any action or proceeding charging a violation of section 1867 of the
Social Security Act [the COBRA antidumping amendment], the court in its discretion may
allow the individual or hospital harmed by the violation reasonable attorney's fees as part of
the costs." Id. at 55 (letter of Judith Waxman). See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CooE §
1317.6(0 (West Supp. 1988)(providing for the award of reasonable attorney's fees).
368. Equal Access, supra note 2, at 55, 57-58 (statement of Judith Waxman); id. at
261-62 (statement of Lois Salisbury, Attorney, Coalition to Stop Patient Dumping); id. at
299 (letter of Gordon Bonnyman, Staff Attorney, Legal Services of Middle Tennessee); H.R.
REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 22 (1988).
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harmed by the hospital's violation.369 Under common law, lost
wages are an important measure of compensatory damages. Yet,
the poor are often disabled or unemployed and thus, there is little
expectation of any compensatory damages for economic loss. It is
often not worth the expense of suing the hospital. Thus, even when
an injury is not serious and an award of substantial compensatory
damages is not likely, the hospital will at least be forced to pay a
minimum amount of monetary damages to the victim. A liquidated
damages provision would strengthen the rights of the poor to utilize the threat of a private cause of action as an effective enforcement tool. 370
CoNCLUSION

An understanding of the evolution of the legal duty to provide
emergency care should put the current state of the law in a more
meaningful context. It should also alert us to the problems that
still remain.
Traditional tort law did not provide the basis for establishing
a duty to treat those in need of emergency care and in active labor.
The no-duty rule, immunity, and misinterpretation of the scant
case law slowed any progress toward the search for a duty. It was
not until the 1960s that the Manlove reliance theory offered a potential source for expansion of liability. Neither the Afanlove reliance theory nor the approach of the Guerrero court, which found
the source of the duty in state licensing laws, provided a satisfactory solution. With few exceptions, state law has also been limited
in its approach to the problem, although Texas and California have
provided leadership. These state approaches do not provide for a
nationwide solution. Use of the federal Hill-Burton law has also
been ineffective in enforcing a duty to provide emergency care.
The COBRA statute does provide a source for the duty to provide emergency care. At a minimum, every individual who enters
an emergency room must be examined without regard to ability to
pay. The hospital-patient relationship has been established by law.
Nevertheless, problems of definition and scope may impact on enforcement. How effective will civil enforcement be? The answer de369.
exists in
370.
Refer to

Equal Access, supra note 2, at 301-02 (Letter of Bonnyman). Such a provision
the federal Truth in Lending Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982).
Liquidated damages might be set at $50,000, to match the civil penalty provision.
notes 304-05 supra and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 26 Hous. L. Rev. 75 1989

76

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:21

pends on the barriers the injured plaintiff will face when bringing a
private cause of action to obtain damages or appropriate equitable
relief under state law. Conflicts will arise between this new federal
cause of action and state law. Without strict judicial action, COBRA may follow in the footsteps of past attempts to find the solution to a problem that will not go away.
In any case, the law does have limits. The economic marketplace dictates many of the choices, and society has to continue to
address the problem of access to health care for all, regardless of
ability to pay. In the end, it is the duty of the health care institutions, the providers, and our society to ensure that all persons, rich
or poor, obtain medical care-at least when they are most vulnerable: at the entrance to the emergency room.
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